Last office hours

Again, I just wanted to remind you that I will be available for office hours on Monday, April 23 (2 days after the Rapture), from 12-4 pm. Assuming that we are not all burning in Hell's fiery cauldron of eternal suffering, you can stop by and talk with me about your essay (which will be due regardless of the Rapture).

I will be at Gotham Cafe, which is about 2 blocks from Hunter, at 2nd Ave between 68th and 69th Streets.

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Also, if you didn't notice it already, I posted below a list of suggestions for continued reading, in response to Andrew's request.  If I can assist with other more specific suggestions, please don't hesitate to ask.

A thought on the alleged rapture...

As many of you may've read, there is a small segment of extremely religious folks that believe that the Rapture, the end of days, is coming very soon -- namely Saturday, May 21st, at 6pm. This belief stems from the mathematical analysis of the bible as done by one particular preacher named Harold Camping.

Some folks, however, are taking it very seriously. One NYC man has retirement savings -- including $140,000 for an ad campaign -- to spread the word of the forthcoming rapture.

Why bring this up?

As I considered the ludicrous notion of the world ending on Saturday in tandem with our reading of Fear and Trembling, it dawned on me that something JdS/Kierkegaard mentions early on about the story of Abraham is true: we know that Abraham's act was a trial of God but only because we have the complete story and can reflect on it after the fact. At the time, however, his actions would have seem off, unethical, or wrong.

So then what of this NYC man? To him, this is his faith. He believes he has an absolute duty to god, and instruction to spread the gospel and alert people that their window for redemption is closely. He's sacrificed his money and his belongings and his time to do this.

On Saturday, if the Rapture were to actually happen as he foretells, those of us left behind would basically be saying "Wow, he was right; he did have a relationship with god, he was a man of faith" -- no?

But when it doesn't happen, we'll pity him or mock him or ignore him until he fades into history, a tragic character who sacrificed everything for nothing.

So do we need to know the final results to really judge someone a Knight of Faith? Can we only know whether someone is acting out of faith or demonic influence/sin after we see the results of the action?

It's a fine line, as we discussed, between an act of faith or an act of sin, in both cases prioritizing the individual over the universal. The difference is that absolute relationship with, and duty to, god -- but it's something we can't see, from the outside world, during the action.

Just something that crossed my mind and that I found interesting to ponder.

Continued Reading/Study

This was a great idea of Andrew's, namely, that I might suggest some books for you to continue reading or study beyond this course. Below I have included other writings by each philosopher and also on some of the topics we discussed.

Other works by Kant, you might want to read.
Critique of Pure Reason (Guyer/Wood translation, from Cambridge UP),
Critique of Judgment (Pluhar translation, Hackett)--on aesthetics
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals--on a purely rational ethical philosophy

Two contemporary interpretations of Kant's transcendental idealism:
P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense
Henry Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism

One excellent and accessible guide to the Critique of Pure Reason:
Sebastian Gardner, The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason


On transcendental idealism, more broadly construed:
Salomon Maimon, Essay on Transcendental Philosophy (by a contemporary of Kant's who the latter described as having the most insight into his work, only recently translated into English)
Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude (by a contemporary philosopher)

Other works by Hegel
Phenomenology of Spirit, but especially the selections entitled "Lordship and Bondage" and "Preface"
Philosophy of Right (a work on political philosophy, more readable)
Faith and Knowledge, (early, readable work, on the limits on reason and the role of faith in transcendental philosophy)

On something like "the ethical"
Alastair Macintyre, After Virtue (not Hegelian in orientation, but does discuss virtue ethics in great detail, and is a great work, regardless)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics


Other works by Marx
The Communist Manifesto (actually, not as good as other texts, in my opinion)
"The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" (an excellent historical study by Marx)
"The Civil War In France" (Marx's early journalism)
Capital (actually pretty readable, very interesting)
The Marx-Engels Reader (Norton, a must have, with an excellent selection of readings)

Contemporary work by Marxists and Marxist historians
Louis Althusser, For Marx
Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism
Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of the Enlightenment

Other works by Kierkegaard
Repetition (included with the Princeton edition of Fear and Trembling)
Either/Or

On Kierkegaardian philosophemes
Martin Buber, I and Thou
Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity

Existentialist literature
Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea (didactic but interesting)
Albert Camus, The Stranger (the classic work)
Walker Percy, The Moviegoer (I read this in college and really liked it)
Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon (I haven't read this, so cannot vouch for it)
Pretty much anything by Dostoyevsky (I'm not crazy about him, the rest of the world is)

Johannes de silentio, Sarah, and Gloucester

Shortly after JDS’ interpretation of the book of Tobit, the narrator highlights Sarah’s magnitude of ethical maturity when with great praise when he states “to take upon oneself the responsibility of permitting the beloved such a daring venture!” (p.91). This statement, is of course in reference to Sarah’s determination, which is more like a hope, to find a partner in marriage. Any man that would risk himself to be Sarah’s husband, is in effect exposing himself against all odds, to a demonic curse that has seeks to diminish any opportunity for Sarah to give herself to someone. Consequently, this demonic curse, prevents Sarah from the opportunity to obtain happiness brought by love. Nevertheless, Sarah maintains hiddenness in her sorrows, and remains poised enough to once attempts to be wedded to Tobias.

In contrast, to Sarah’s character JDS introduces Gloucester or Richard the Third, who, unlike Sarah did not possess the courage to “bear the pity he was at the mercy on from childhood” (p. 92). Although, both Sarah and Gloucester were portrayed by JDS as both, being distinct, in both their situations and consequent behaviors. Nevertheless, JDS seems to imply, that there is an existing correlation between both Sarah and Gloucester, that which places both of them “thoroughly in the paradox” (p.93). Adding on, JDS insinuates that none of these two characster, Sarah or Gloucester along with their existence, can be labeled as competent beings within ethical society. Instead, JDS asserts that to judge both Sarah and Gloucester on a standard of ethics, would be ridiculing both subjects. For example, it would be like asking Sarah “Why do you not express the universal and get married” (p. 93).

By contrasting both Sarah and Gloucester, one could see how JDS attempts to portray to the lector the contrast between the inner spiritual world, and the external world of the ethical. Although, it is quite clear to assume that Gloucester who failed to contain himself in the face of pity, was lost in a paradox as a “vile demoniac” As a vile demoniac, Gloucester could be considered “a slave of the finite,” unable to conform to the discord between his being and what he desires. In contrast, is it accurate to assume that Sarah, who through her trials and tribulation was able to maintain hiddenness just like Abraham did by keeping his silence when asked by God to sacrifice Isaac, is “saved in the divine paradox?” If so, does the resignation to the pain and suffering she allowed on herself, put her above the universal and thus affords her the title of Knight of Faith?

Problem III

Was it ethically defensible of Abraham to conceal his undertaking from Sarah, from Eliezer,from Isaac?

Kierkegaard through JD straightaway states the issues that should be taken into account in order to understand what this problem in the form of a question entails: "If there is no concealment that has its rationale in the single individual as the particular being higher than the universal, then Abraham's conduct is indefensible, for he disregarded the ethical intermediary forums. If there is such a concealment, however, then we are at the paradox, which cannot be mediated because it is due precisely to the single individual as the particular being higher than the universal, but the universal is precisely the mediation". Is Abraham violating his ethical duty by which he is expected to explain the reasons for his action (whether he is correct or no in taking such action) in which case by not fulfilling his duty for disclosure demanded by the ethical he would be following an aesthetic mode of living? If, on the other hand, the concealment is due to the single individual transcending the ethical then the "rationale" for Abraham's action cannot be communicated intelligibly, cannot be mediated, is at bottom irrational and not capable of universalizability. Herein lies the paradox.

In the words of JD: "Ethics demands disclosure, (but) it cannot be denied that secrecy and silence actually makes for greatness in a person precisely because they are qualifications of inwardness." If the command to kill Isaac comes directly from God, and therefore not mediated by the universal (which indeed it couldn't be, for it would be murder ethically speaking), then is Abraham's silence "in the demon's snare" mired in self-pity and unbridled egotism? How are we the reader supposed to understand the paradox of silence that can at once be demonism and the deity in communication with the single individual possessing true inwardness. These are the questions which K seeks to elucidate.

The following words of JD I take to be K's "the path I have to take is to carry concealment dialectically through esthetics and ethics, for the point is to take esthetic concealment and the paradox appear in their absolute dissimilarity" and in a discussion of examples from dramas: "esthetics demanded concealment and awarded it, ethics demanded disclosure and punished it."

The first of the poetic personages which JD relates in order to compare with the story of Abraham, taken from Aristotle, the bridegroom's impending marriage is predicted by the augers to lead to misfortune. Should he then keep silent and get married so as not to cause pain for the bride, at least for a while, or keep silent and not get married thus destroying the relationship, or else speak which would cause unhappiness. In choosing between the esthetic and the ethical, The choice calling for disclosure would be out of a concern for the ethical. So the bridegroom's dilemma is between the esthetic and the ethical. What does this have to do with Abraham? "if heaven had not been proclaimed (to the bridegroom) through an augur quite privately, in an altogether private relationship to him, then we are at the paradox in which he could not speak...his silence would not be due to his wanting to place himself as the single individual in an absolute relation to the universal but to his having been placed as the single individual in an absolute relation to the absolute."

So K's answer to Problem three is yes because Abraham's silence is different from the bridgroom's (as well as the other poetic personages) in that it is concealment arising out of a one-to-one relationship with the absolute. Morally, it is one thing to lead an exemplary, ethical life that is externally commendable, it is another thing for the lone individual in the self's relation to God.

Faith and Doubt and Choice

In Problem III, Kierkegaard -- writing as JdS -- addresses the notion indicated in his nom de plume, that of silence and its role in faith by focusing on Abraham's silence to his friends and family as undertook the journey to sacrifice Isaac.

To do so, JdS investigates other literary and historical figures and their actions. Of particular interest to me was the inclusion of Faust, the famed German figure -- scientist and magician who sold his soul to the devil.

JdS tells us that Faust epitomized the notion of the doubter, an "apostate of the spirit who goes the way of the flesh." His doubt is so powerful, so terrifying, that were it unleashed it would cause those in its path to tremble in fear.

Faust, like Abraham, stays silent. He does this by choice, recognizing the chaos his doubt would cause. But does the same apply to Abraham?

So is Faust a Knight of Faith? It seems the parallel of silence indicates more than just their constraint; both would be condemned by ethics because their refusal to speak, their refusal to acknowledge the universal via speech[97]. The tragic hero, as we've seen, makes his sacrifice FOR the universal[99] instead, so I think Faust would transcend that identity.

But this brings to mind something we also discussed in class, and something that the discussion caused me to wonder. The ineffable, unintelligible movement of faith, of moving through the universal to the singular individual, is not something that can be spoken or even understood by man's reason. The Knight of Faith is silent, but seemingly not by choice -- it's simply an attribute of being a Knight of Faith, a property but not a willful action.

Faust, on the other hand, chooses to remain silent, for fear of the effect his doubt would have. This fear, seemingly related to the anxiety of faith, differs in its choice. Abraham did not choose to remain silent; the idea of speaking to his faith was not one that even crossed his mind, it was not an option, it was just an effect of his faith[101].

So does Faust fail the Knight of Faith test? And furthermore -- another question I've been pondering -- can one who recognizes and acknowledges the nature of faith, as described by JdS, even become a Knight of Faith? Or does the simple act of reading JdS, the cognition of acknowledging faith's nature, make it impossible for the reader to ever become a true Knight of Faith?

Tobias and Sarah

Johannes has an unusual interpretation of the story of Tobias and Sarah in the Book of Tobit. In this story, a young woman named Sarah has been married seven times but each one of her husbands has been killed on the wedding night by a jealous demon who loves her. Sarah is therefore very frustrated because she is excluded from the possibility of ever being in love. Tobias, though he knows how many failed marriages she has had, decides that he loves her too much to not marry her. So he marries her and prays to God to be saved from the demon, though he knows that he is risking his life by attempting to have intercourse with her.

Johannes says that in any retelling by a poet, the hero would be Tobias. He’d be praised for risking his life to gain the hand of the woman he loves. However, Johannes says that Tobias actually was not such a hero. He says that, though it was brave and gallant, any man who truly loves a woman should have behaved the exact same way. Tobias’ sacrifice was noble but expected and fairly conventional. The far bigger heroism belonged to Sarah for being able to accept Tobias’ love, for allowing Tobias to do it for her and for later not hating him for having done such a thing for her. Johannes says that anyone else would have hated to be in that kind of lifelong debt and Sarah showed the highest humility towards another human being by being able to accept Tobias’ risk and open herself to the possibility of love. To be willing to accept responsibility and guilt for his fate if he died and to not resent him forever if he lived showed much greater courage and renunciation of pride. She chose the divine over the demonic, when it would have been easier to accept the demonic.

Johannes asks us to imagine that Sarah was a man and that he knew a demon would kill his new wife. He says that it would be the easy thing to do to accept the demonic, refuse true love and get married to enjoy the sensation of killing girls on their wedding night. This would be choosing the demonic by assenting to the demon’s rules, taking the selfish route and banishing your sense of personal guilt. Sarah had the much harder task by having to openly take someone’s pity to have herself saved, an experience which must always be humiliating. Johannes invokes Gloucester from Richard the Third, the evilest character in Shakespeare, to show how unbearable pity is. He says that Gloucester is a monster because he is at the mercy of pity and is unable to accept it.

Do you agree with Johannes that it is far harder to receive than to give? Do you agree that a major source of the demonic is the inability to accept sympathy?

Problem One

In Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard discusses his three major problems, spicifically, in this section, he discussed the first problem: Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?

Kierkegaard, while holding up the mask of Johanes de Silencio, uses the metaphor of Abraham's journey with Isaac to personify and characterize his point. As we have discussed in class and in previous blog posts, Kierkegaard, as Silencio, releases his views and opinions into a thick sifter of irony, using a less than parallel Silencio argument to prove his own point. In this case, Silencio follows Hegelian logic (which is Kierkegaard's way of denouncing said logic) and comes to the conclusion that Abraham is a murderer and a sinner.

However, because this is not honestly Kierkegaard saying these things, and it is instead Silencio, we cannot take any of these statements or claims at face value. This unreliable narration serves a point in itself, which is the matter of decisiveness and choice. This serves as a platform for Kierkegaard (or Silencio) to ask his first question: Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical.

When K says Teleological suspension of the ethical, he is talking about a set of actions that are done with a specific goal that will lie at the end of the line--be it life, existence, or what have you. It's very similar to the concept of a formal dogma that is found in nearly all major religions. To continue that thought, Kierkegaard asks the question, "is it right for a person to forgo their own, personal obligations for the sake of the universal, the specific goal. He asks us if there is a higher power that is more important than, and is able to cancel out our human goals.

Personally, I feel that there is not a way for some higher power to trump or conquer our human goals. Hegel and Silencio would disagree with me though, as they both assert that faith (that belief in the perfection of the higher power) is the highest telos capable of mankind, and that it is irrefutable in it's level of importance. However the, if I were to again go back to the story of Abraham (like K does time and time again this book), I would find a concept of faith that is flawed and skewed and altogether non-finite--with rules and doctrines that shift and bend according to the individual. If this notion of Faith was truly absolute, Abraham's feelings of humanity and obligation to his son would have dissipated in the act--for if Abraham truly was to be the father of true faith (and someone who spoke directly with God), he would have been able to brutally murder his son without a second thought.

Faith and Rationality

In the Preliminary Outpourings section of Fear and Trembling, John de silentio furthers the concept of faith having an (essential) element of “absurdity” in its composition. Faith therefore cannot be rationally understood because of this element of absurdity. This is by and far the most brain-wracking part of this section for me. If faith cannot be rationalized, how can it co-exist with rationality or in a rational world? Does this not call for a world filled with either people of faith or a world of rational people? Jds does think that rationality (in the form of philosophy) has a certain utility (which he hasn’t really defined yet) but it cannot attempt to bestow faith (since faith cannot be rationalized) (page 27). Yet to have faith is the “highest” state of being, a state that he insists would take most people a lifetime to comprehend. Furthermore it would seem entirely plausible that most people would have gone an entire lifetime without reaching this point. It would seem however, that faith should be the ultimate goal to strive for and society (either members of the religious society or society as a whole) would then constantly be striving to reach this point. Yet considering (Jds’) ruminations on how he would hypothetically attempt deter someone from replicating Abraham’s act of faith, the strain between the rational and faith becomes really jarring. According to Jds, people who wrongly attempt to perform acts of faith can be subjected to the laws of the rational world (he mentions physical punishment and admitting someone to a mental-asylum). Yet it seems as if we would only realize that someone is not truly a Knight of Faith after we see that he has not received something back through “the virtue of the absurd” (as Abraham received Isaac and the K.O.F receives his princess). We only realize that they are not K.O.F when we see that no miracle has occurred; how could this logic be accepted in a rational society? Also, of faith is where we are trying to reach, why have/teach rationality at all? Does it not simply complicate matters? If a miracle occurs, does that not prove the futility of rationality in the light of faith? Let’s say that you saw someone about to ‘sacrifice’ or ‘murder’ someone in the street under the premise of ‘faith’ or ‘virtue of the absurd’. Despite your attempts to talk him/her out of doing this, he/she insists that it must be done for them to show their ‘faith’ to God. Do you attempt to physically stop the person or do you wait to see if something miraculous happens? If you interfere, are you interfering in something of a divine nature and what are the ramifications for interfering? My conclusion is that they seemingly cannot co-exist. If rationality pales in the light of faith, what then is the utility of rationality?

Poets and the necessity of Heroes?

According to Kierkegaard, heroes and poets are dependent on each other and necessarily need each other. However, if the passing of history is merely through poets, what is the necessity of heroes? Let us say Achilles never existed and Homer just made him up. The story of Achilles survives and he is a hero in that story, so the concept of the hero exists, yet the hero himself never did. (Not exactly parallel, but the concept of a unicorn exists without the actual unicorns existing. We do not believe unicorns are real. However, what if there was a Homer who wrote about them, would we now consider them extinct akin to dinosaurs?) The value of the story and the history itself is not affected by existence, or lack thereof, of the heroes, merely the poets.

Knight of Faith-Abraham

Fear and Trembling is written by Soren Kierkegaard and was published in 1843 under the pseudonym of Johannes de silentio. The book is presented in a dialectical mode relating different issues such as between a life of religious faith and the ethical life. Fear and Trembling begins with a preface that focuses on the concept of doubt and faith. “Not only in the commercial world but in the realm of ideas as well, our age is holding a veritable clearance sale. Everything is had so dirt cheap that it is doubtful whether in the end anyone will bid. Every speculative score-keeper who conscientiously keep account of the momentous march of modern philosophy, every lecture, tutor, student, every outsider and insider in philosophy does not stop doubting everything but goes further”(p.3).
In the biblical story of Abraham and Issac, God asked Abraham to sacrifice his only son Issac in the Mount Moriah. At that time, Abraham has a choice to either complete the task of killing his son or just simply disobey the God. Despite of his choices, he just follows God’s command without any question and went to kill his son. When he is going to kill his son an angel came and stop him from sacrificing his innocent son. In this way, Abraham became a knight of faith because he was willing to do what God asked of him. If we considered Abraham’s act ethically, he is wrong because he cannot take someone’s life. However, he is right if Absolute is concerned. Therefore, we can clearly see that this book is not about ethics (what is morally or wrong) but it is about faith. By the definition of faith, we can understand that it is a trust on person or thing and it is not based on proof. In the first section of Fear and Trembling, the author present four different stories and it has its own morality and outcome in each story. Each part of the answer corresponds to the question that Abraham asks his inner sight, but he never asks any question to God’s command. We can see that Faith is the highest passion in Abraham.
From above mentioned things in this section of Fear and Trembling, people believe in their faith. Sometimes they are ethically wrong but they relate their act to faith (belief). Abraham’s action to take his son’s life is incomprehensible to others. There are so many religious paradox beliefs like in the story of Abraham and people still believe in those irrational and ethically wrong act. In my Hindu culture also we have ritual acts like sacrificing animals in the name of God. For me those acts are ethically and morally wrong. It make me to think is there such thing like a God who will make us to do evil things or it is just our system of religion that is leading us to act in the name of Faith? We can see everyday people are dying all around the world in the name of Faith.