Last office hours

Again, I just wanted to remind you that I will be available for office hours on Monday, April 23 (2 days after the Rapture), from 12-4 pm. Assuming that we are not all burning in Hell's fiery cauldron of eternal suffering, you can stop by and talk with me about your essay (which will be due regardless of the Rapture).

I will be at Gotham Cafe, which is about 2 blocks from Hunter, at 2nd Ave between 68th and 69th Streets.

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Also, if you didn't notice it already, I posted below a list of suggestions for continued reading, in response to Andrew's request.  If I can assist with other more specific suggestions, please don't hesitate to ask.

A thought on the alleged rapture...

As many of you may've read, there is a small segment of extremely religious folks that believe that the Rapture, the end of days, is coming very soon -- namely Saturday, May 21st, at 6pm. This belief stems from the mathematical analysis of the bible as done by one particular preacher named Harold Camping.

Some folks, however, are taking it very seriously. One NYC man has retirement savings -- including $140,000 for an ad campaign -- to spread the word of the forthcoming rapture.

Why bring this up?

As I considered the ludicrous notion of the world ending on Saturday in tandem with our reading of Fear and Trembling, it dawned on me that something JdS/Kierkegaard mentions early on about the story of Abraham is true: we know that Abraham's act was a trial of God but only because we have the complete story and can reflect on it after the fact. At the time, however, his actions would have seem off, unethical, or wrong.

So then what of this NYC man? To him, this is his faith. He believes he has an absolute duty to god, and instruction to spread the gospel and alert people that their window for redemption is closely. He's sacrificed his money and his belongings and his time to do this.

On Saturday, if the Rapture were to actually happen as he foretells, those of us left behind would basically be saying "Wow, he was right; he did have a relationship with god, he was a man of faith" -- no?

But when it doesn't happen, we'll pity him or mock him or ignore him until he fades into history, a tragic character who sacrificed everything for nothing.

So do we need to know the final results to really judge someone a Knight of Faith? Can we only know whether someone is acting out of faith or demonic influence/sin after we see the results of the action?

It's a fine line, as we discussed, between an act of faith or an act of sin, in both cases prioritizing the individual over the universal. The difference is that absolute relationship with, and duty to, god -- but it's something we can't see, from the outside world, during the action.

Just something that crossed my mind and that I found interesting to ponder.

Continued Reading/Study

This was a great idea of Andrew's, namely, that I might suggest some books for you to continue reading or study beyond this course. Below I have included other writings by each philosopher and also on some of the topics we discussed.

Other works by Kant, you might want to read.
Critique of Pure Reason (Guyer/Wood translation, from Cambridge UP),
Critique of Judgment (Pluhar translation, Hackett)--on aesthetics
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals--on a purely rational ethical philosophy

Two contemporary interpretations of Kant's transcendental idealism:
P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense
Henry Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism

One excellent and accessible guide to the Critique of Pure Reason:
Sebastian Gardner, The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason


On transcendental idealism, more broadly construed:
Salomon Maimon, Essay on Transcendental Philosophy (by a contemporary of Kant's who the latter described as having the most insight into his work, only recently translated into English)
Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude (by a contemporary philosopher)

Other works by Hegel
Phenomenology of Spirit, but especially the selections entitled "Lordship and Bondage" and "Preface"
Philosophy of Right (a work on political philosophy, more readable)
Faith and Knowledge, (early, readable work, on the limits on reason and the role of faith in transcendental philosophy)

On something like "the ethical"
Alastair Macintyre, After Virtue (not Hegelian in orientation, but does discuss virtue ethics in great detail, and is a great work, regardless)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics


Other works by Marx
The Communist Manifesto (actually, not as good as other texts, in my opinion)
"The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" (an excellent historical study by Marx)
"The Civil War In France" (Marx's early journalism)
Capital (actually pretty readable, very interesting)
The Marx-Engels Reader (Norton, a must have, with an excellent selection of readings)

Contemporary work by Marxists and Marxist historians
Louis Althusser, For Marx
Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism
Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of the Enlightenment

Other works by Kierkegaard
Repetition (included with the Princeton edition of Fear and Trembling)
Either/Or

On Kierkegaardian philosophemes
Martin Buber, I and Thou
Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity

Existentialist literature
Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea (didactic but interesting)
Albert Camus, The Stranger (the classic work)
Walker Percy, The Moviegoer (I read this in college and really liked it)
Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon (I haven't read this, so cannot vouch for it)
Pretty much anything by Dostoyevsky (I'm not crazy about him, the rest of the world is)

Johannes de silentio, Sarah, and Gloucester

Shortly after JDS’ interpretation of the book of Tobit, the narrator highlights Sarah’s magnitude of ethical maturity when with great praise when he states “to take upon oneself the responsibility of permitting the beloved such a daring venture!” (p.91). This statement, is of course in reference to Sarah’s determination, which is more like a hope, to find a partner in marriage. Any man that would risk himself to be Sarah’s husband, is in effect exposing himself against all odds, to a demonic curse that has seeks to diminish any opportunity for Sarah to give herself to someone. Consequently, this demonic curse, prevents Sarah from the opportunity to obtain happiness brought by love. Nevertheless, Sarah maintains hiddenness in her sorrows, and remains poised enough to once attempts to be wedded to Tobias.

In contrast, to Sarah’s character JDS introduces Gloucester or Richard the Third, who, unlike Sarah did not possess the courage to “bear the pity he was at the mercy on from childhood” (p. 92). Although, both Sarah and Gloucester were portrayed by JDS as both, being distinct, in both their situations and consequent behaviors. Nevertheless, JDS seems to imply, that there is an existing correlation between both Sarah and Gloucester, that which places both of them “thoroughly in the paradox” (p.93). Adding on, JDS insinuates that none of these two characster, Sarah or Gloucester along with their existence, can be labeled as competent beings within ethical society. Instead, JDS asserts that to judge both Sarah and Gloucester on a standard of ethics, would be ridiculing both subjects. For example, it would be like asking Sarah “Why do you not express the universal and get married” (p. 93).

By contrasting both Sarah and Gloucester, one could see how JDS attempts to portray to the lector the contrast between the inner spiritual world, and the external world of the ethical. Although, it is quite clear to assume that Gloucester who failed to contain himself in the face of pity, was lost in a paradox as a “vile demoniac” As a vile demoniac, Gloucester could be considered “a slave of the finite,” unable to conform to the discord between his being and what he desires. In contrast, is it accurate to assume that Sarah, who through her trials and tribulation was able to maintain hiddenness just like Abraham did by keeping his silence when asked by God to sacrifice Isaac, is “saved in the divine paradox?” If so, does the resignation to the pain and suffering she allowed on herself, put her above the universal and thus affords her the title of Knight of Faith?

Problem III

Was it ethically defensible of Abraham to conceal his undertaking from Sarah, from Eliezer,from Isaac?

Kierkegaard through JD straightaway states the issues that should be taken into account in order to understand what this problem in the form of a question entails: "If there is no concealment that has its rationale in the single individual as the particular being higher than the universal, then Abraham's conduct is indefensible, for he disregarded the ethical intermediary forums. If there is such a concealment, however, then we are at the paradox, which cannot be mediated because it is due precisely to the single individual as the particular being higher than the universal, but the universal is precisely the mediation". Is Abraham violating his ethical duty by which he is expected to explain the reasons for his action (whether he is correct or no in taking such action) in which case by not fulfilling his duty for disclosure demanded by the ethical he would be following an aesthetic mode of living? If, on the other hand, the concealment is due to the single individual transcending the ethical then the "rationale" for Abraham's action cannot be communicated intelligibly, cannot be mediated, is at bottom irrational and not capable of universalizability. Herein lies the paradox.

In the words of JD: "Ethics demands disclosure, (but) it cannot be denied that secrecy and silence actually makes for greatness in a person precisely because they are qualifications of inwardness." If the command to kill Isaac comes directly from God, and therefore not mediated by the universal (which indeed it couldn't be, for it would be murder ethically speaking), then is Abraham's silence "in the demon's snare" mired in self-pity and unbridled egotism? How are we the reader supposed to understand the paradox of silence that can at once be demonism and the deity in communication with the single individual possessing true inwardness. These are the questions which K seeks to elucidate.

The following words of JD I take to be K's "the path I have to take is to carry concealment dialectically through esthetics and ethics, for the point is to take esthetic concealment and the paradox appear in their absolute dissimilarity" and in a discussion of examples from dramas: "esthetics demanded concealment and awarded it, ethics demanded disclosure and punished it."

The first of the poetic personages which JD relates in order to compare with the story of Abraham, taken from Aristotle, the bridegroom's impending marriage is predicted by the augers to lead to misfortune. Should he then keep silent and get married so as not to cause pain for the bride, at least for a while, or keep silent and not get married thus destroying the relationship, or else speak which would cause unhappiness. In choosing between the esthetic and the ethical, The choice calling for disclosure would be out of a concern for the ethical. So the bridegroom's dilemma is between the esthetic and the ethical. What does this have to do with Abraham? "if heaven had not been proclaimed (to the bridegroom) through an augur quite privately, in an altogether private relationship to him, then we are at the paradox in which he could not speak...his silence would not be due to his wanting to place himself as the single individual in an absolute relation to the universal but to his having been placed as the single individual in an absolute relation to the absolute."

So K's answer to Problem three is yes because Abraham's silence is different from the bridgroom's (as well as the other poetic personages) in that it is concealment arising out of a one-to-one relationship with the absolute. Morally, it is one thing to lead an exemplary, ethical life that is externally commendable, it is another thing for the lone individual in the self's relation to God.

Faith and Doubt and Choice

In Problem III, Kierkegaard -- writing as JdS -- addresses the notion indicated in his nom de plume, that of silence and its role in faith by focusing on Abraham's silence to his friends and family as undertook the journey to sacrifice Isaac.

To do so, JdS investigates other literary and historical figures and their actions. Of particular interest to me was the inclusion of Faust, the famed German figure -- scientist and magician who sold his soul to the devil.

JdS tells us that Faust epitomized the notion of the doubter, an "apostate of the spirit who goes the way of the flesh." His doubt is so powerful, so terrifying, that were it unleashed it would cause those in its path to tremble in fear.

Faust, like Abraham, stays silent. He does this by choice, recognizing the chaos his doubt would cause. But does the same apply to Abraham?

So is Faust a Knight of Faith? It seems the parallel of silence indicates more than just their constraint; both would be condemned by ethics because their refusal to speak, their refusal to acknowledge the universal via speech[97]. The tragic hero, as we've seen, makes his sacrifice FOR the universal[99] instead, so I think Faust would transcend that identity.

But this brings to mind something we also discussed in class, and something that the discussion caused me to wonder. The ineffable, unintelligible movement of faith, of moving through the universal to the singular individual, is not something that can be spoken or even understood by man's reason. The Knight of Faith is silent, but seemingly not by choice -- it's simply an attribute of being a Knight of Faith, a property but not a willful action.

Faust, on the other hand, chooses to remain silent, for fear of the effect his doubt would have. This fear, seemingly related to the anxiety of faith, differs in its choice. Abraham did not choose to remain silent; the idea of speaking to his faith was not one that even crossed his mind, it was not an option, it was just an effect of his faith[101].

So does Faust fail the Knight of Faith test? And furthermore -- another question I've been pondering -- can one who recognizes and acknowledges the nature of faith, as described by JdS, even become a Knight of Faith? Or does the simple act of reading JdS, the cognition of acknowledging faith's nature, make it impossible for the reader to ever become a true Knight of Faith?

Tobias and Sarah

Johannes has an unusual interpretation of the story of Tobias and Sarah in the Book of Tobit. In this story, a young woman named Sarah has been married seven times but each one of her husbands has been killed on the wedding night by a jealous demon who loves her. Sarah is therefore very frustrated because she is excluded from the possibility of ever being in love. Tobias, though he knows how many failed marriages she has had, decides that he loves her too much to not marry her. So he marries her and prays to God to be saved from the demon, though he knows that he is risking his life by attempting to have intercourse with her.

Johannes says that in any retelling by a poet, the hero would be Tobias. He’d be praised for risking his life to gain the hand of the woman he loves. However, Johannes says that Tobias actually was not such a hero. He says that, though it was brave and gallant, any man who truly loves a woman should have behaved the exact same way. Tobias’ sacrifice was noble but expected and fairly conventional. The far bigger heroism belonged to Sarah for being able to accept Tobias’ love, for allowing Tobias to do it for her and for later not hating him for having done such a thing for her. Johannes says that anyone else would have hated to be in that kind of lifelong debt and Sarah showed the highest humility towards another human being by being able to accept Tobias’ risk and open herself to the possibility of love. To be willing to accept responsibility and guilt for his fate if he died and to not resent him forever if he lived showed much greater courage and renunciation of pride. She chose the divine over the demonic, when it would have been easier to accept the demonic.

Johannes asks us to imagine that Sarah was a man and that he knew a demon would kill his new wife. He says that it would be the easy thing to do to accept the demonic, refuse true love and get married to enjoy the sensation of killing girls on their wedding night. This would be choosing the demonic by assenting to the demon’s rules, taking the selfish route and banishing your sense of personal guilt. Sarah had the much harder task by having to openly take someone’s pity to have herself saved, an experience which must always be humiliating. Johannes invokes Gloucester from Richard the Third, the evilest character in Shakespeare, to show how unbearable pity is. He says that Gloucester is a monster because he is at the mercy of pity and is unable to accept it.

Do you agree with Johannes that it is far harder to receive than to give? Do you agree that a major source of the demonic is the inability to accept sympathy?

Problem One

In Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard discusses his three major problems, spicifically, in this section, he discussed the first problem: Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?

Kierkegaard, while holding up the mask of Johanes de Silencio, uses the metaphor of Abraham's journey with Isaac to personify and characterize his point. As we have discussed in class and in previous blog posts, Kierkegaard, as Silencio, releases his views and opinions into a thick sifter of irony, using a less than parallel Silencio argument to prove his own point. In this case, Silencio follows Hegelian logic (which is Kierkegaard's way of denouncing said logic) and comes to the conclusion that Abraham is a murderer and a sinner.

However, because this is not honestly Kierkegaard saying these things, and it is instead Silencio, we cannot take any of these statements or claims at face value. This unreliable narration serves a point in itself, which is the matter of decisiveness and choice. This serves as a platform for Kierkegaard (or Silencio) to ask his first question: Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical.

When K says Teleological suspension of the ethical, he is talking about a set of actions that are done with a specific goal that will lie at the end of the line--be it life, existence, or what have you. It's very similar to the concept of a formal dogma that is found in nearly all major religions. To continue that thought, Kierkegaard asks the question, "is it right for a person to forgo their own, personal obligations for the sake of the universal, the specific goal. He asks us if there is a higher power that is more important than, and is able to cancel out our human goals.

Personally, I feel that there is not a way for some higher power to trump or conquer our human goals. Hegel and Silencio would disagree with me though, as they both assert that faith (that belief in the perfection of the higher power) is the highest telos capable of mankind, and that it is irrefutable in it's level of importance. However the, if I were to again go back to the story of Abraham (like K does time and time again this book), I would find a concept of faith that is flawed and skewed and altogether non-finite--with rules and doctrines that shift and bend according to the individual. If this notion of Faith was truly absolute, Abraham's feelings of humanity and obligation to his son would have dissipated in the act--for if Abraham truly was to be the father of true faith (and someone who spoke directly with God), he would have been able to brutally murder his son without a second thought.

Faith and Rationality

In the Preliminary Outpourings section of Fear and Trembling, John de silentio furthers the concept of faith having an (essential) element of “absurdity” in its composition. Faith therefore cannot be rationally understood because of this element of absurdity. This is by and far the most brain-wracking part of this section for me. If faith cannot be rationalized, how can it co-exist with rationality or in a rational world? Does this not call for a world filled with either people of faith or a world of rational people? Jds does think that rationality (in the form of philosophy) has a certain utility (which he hasn’t really defined yet) but it cannot attempt to bestow faith (since faith cannot be rationalized) (page 27). Yet to have faith is the “highest” state of being, a state that he insists would take most people a lifetime to comprehend. Furthermore it would seem entirely plausible that most people would have gone an entire lifetime without reaching this point. It would seem however, that faith should be the ultimate goal to strive for and society (either members of the religious society or society as a whole) would then constantly be striving to reach this point. Yet considering (Jds’) ruminations on how he would hypothetically attempt deter someone from replicating Abraham’s act of faith, the strain between the rational and faith becomes really jarring. According to Jds, people who wrongly attempt to perform acts of faith can be subjected to the laws of the rational world (he mentions physical punishment and admitting someone to a mental-asylum). Yet it seems as if we would only realize that someone is not truly a Knight of Faith after we see that he has not received something back through “the virtue of the absurd” (as Abraham received Isaac and the K.O.F receives his princess). We only realize that they are not K.O.F when we see that no miracle has occurred; how could this logic be accepted in a rational society? Also, of faith is where we are trying to reach, why have/teach rationality at all? Does it not simply complicate matters? If a miracle occurs, does that not prove the futility of rationality in the light of faith? Let’s say that you saw someone about to ‘sacrifice’ or ‘murder’ someone in the street under the premise of ‘faith’ or ‘virtue of the absurd’. Despite your attempts to talk him/her out of doing this, he/she insists that it must be done for them to show their ‘faith’ to God. Do you attempt to physically stop the person or do you wait to see if something miraculous happens? If you interfere, are you interfering in something of a divine nature and what are the ramifications for interfering? My conclusion is that they seemingly cannot co-exist. If rationality pales in the light of faith, what then is the utility of rationality?

Poets and the necessity of Heroes?

According to Kierkegaard, heroes and poets are dependent on each other and necessarily need each other. However, if the passing of history is merely through poets, what is the necessity of heroes? Let us say Achilles never existed and Homer just made him up. The story of Achilles survives and he is a hero in that story, so the concept of the hero exists, yet the hero himself never did. (Not exactly parallel, but the concept of a unicorn exists without the actual unicorns existing. We do not believe unicorns are real. However, what if there was a Homer who wrote about them, would we now consider them extinct akin to dinosaurs?) The value of the story and the history itself is not affected by existence, or lack thereof, of the heroes, merely the poets.

Knight of Faith-Abraham

Fear and Trembling is written by Soren Kierkegaard and was published in 1843 under the pseudonym of Johannes de silentio. The book is presented in a dialectical mode relating different issues such as between a life of religious faith and the ethical life. Fear and Trembling begins with a preface that focuses on the concept of doubt and faith. “Not only in the commercial world but in the realm of ideas as well, our age is holding a veritable clearance sale. Everything is had so dirt cheap that it is doubtful whether in the end anyone will bid. Every speculative score-keeper who conscientiously keep account of the momentous march of modern philosophy, every lecture, tutor, student, every outsider and insider in philosophy does not stop doubting everything but goes further”(p.3).
In the biblical story of Abraham and Issac, God asked Abraham to sacrifice his only son Issac in the Mount Moriah. At that time, Abraham has a choice to either complete the task of killing his son or just simply disobey the God. Despite of his choices, he just follows God’s command without any question and went to kill his son. When he is going to kill his son an angel came and stop him from sacrificing his innocent son. In this way, Abraham became a knight of faith because he was willing to do what God asked of him. If we considered Abraham’s act ethically, he is wrong because he cannot take someone’s life. However, he is right if Absolute is concerned. Therefore, we can clearly see that this book is not about ethics (what is morally or wrong) but it is about faith. By the definition of faith, we can understand that it is a trust on person or thing and it is not based on proof. In the first section of Fear and Trembling, the author present four different stories and it has its own morality and outcome in each story. Each part of the answer corresponds to the question that Abraham asks his inner sight, but he never asks any question to God’s command. We can see that Faith is the highest passion in Abraham.
From above mentioned things in this section of Fear and Trembling, people believe in their faith. Sometimes they are ethically wrong but they relate their act to faith (belief). Abraham’s action to take his son’s life is incomprehensible to others. There are so many religious paradox beliefs like in the story of Abraham and people still believe in those irrational and ethically wrong act. In my Hindu culture also we have ritual acts like sacrificing animals in the name of God. For me those acts are ethically and morally wrong. It make me to think is there such thing like a God who will make us to do evil things or it is just our system of religion that is leading us to act in the name of Faith? We can see everyday people are dying all around the world in the name of Faith.

Abraham's faith

This section in Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling starts out with a critique of the Hegelian system. Using the pseudonym of Johannes de silentio, Kierkegaard states that faith cannot be understood as a "concept" because it is unknown. This is seen when Johannes writes that "Even if one were able to convert the whole content of faith into conceptual form, it does not follow that one has comprehended faith, comprehended how one entered into it or how it entered into one" (p. 5).

Johannes continues to question the role of faith in the life of human beings by analyzing Abraham's biblical story; God asks Abraham to sacrifice his son Issac on Mount Moriah, Abraham does not question God's command and sets out to kill his son. When Abraham is about to commit the act an angel appears and tells him that his fear and thus his faith to God has been proven and that he does not need to kill his son anymore (Genesis 22:1-19). Johannes states that this story is hard to comprehend and that he wished he could had been there at the moment it occurred, to see it at first hand. Therefore, the author presents four alternative scenarios to the story of Abraham. Each has a more comprehensible reason for the outcome. By this the author sets out to question why Abraham's acts are so hard to comprehend. Why do alternative stories make more sense than a story of man who undoubtedly followed God's command? By examining in detail the biblical story Johannes concludes that Abraham was the greatest of all man because of his undoubtful faith to God. Johannes highlights that Abraham did not tremble when God asked him to sacrifice his son and he did not beg. Abraham did not doubt God's command, he just followed it with faith in God and the purposes of his command.

This section of the book was quite an interesting one. Knowing the story of Abraham from my religious upbringing, whenever I have thought of it, I have also found myself trying to understand if complete faith is possible, and if so why should it be the representation of goodness? In my perspective Religion is a very complicated topic, sometimes leading us to leave behind what we consider ethical in order to accept the religious beliefs that tell us what it is right. For example, is it ethical for a father to kill his own son? I don't think so, regardless of a the reason a son is a son something that is so valuable for a human being. Also, the idea of a supreme being is something that goes beyond our experience and yet we are qualified as "good" if we accept our relationship to the unknown without questioning. This ideas represent a quarrel between Faith and Reason. To what extent can we accept that which mandates our existence if we do not understand what it is? In order to behave like Abraham we have to shut down our faculty of reason and simply believe that the unknown is right for us.

Marx, Human Activity, and Consciousness

Continuing his barrage on the Hegelian “speculative impulse” which Marx stated becomes rubbish, once the history of human activity is taken into account. Marx adds, it is “[w]here speculation ends-in real life- there real, positive science begins: the representation of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of men” (p.48).

Initially man, in his initial state in history was conscious, but mentally, not far more equipped than the animal that reacts immediately off instinct. As time went on nevertheless, man, became more conditioned by the circumstances brought upon him by history. These conditions or circumstances prompted his activity, in order to fulfill means, such as to hunt in order to eat. Through human activity, the consciousness of man evolved, along with the circumstances of which man himself had influence on.

For example, it would have been very difficult for a primitive man, to take down a giant mammoth all by himself. Through the development and employment of language to communicate strategies, along with the co-operation of other men e.g. “productive force,” it made the hunting of the mammoth more feasible. Thus, the hunting of a mammoth, would have achieved the mean of feeding the community. As man evolved, the population grew, and small game could not feed the population. Therefore, new methods had to be applied to new circumstances, both evolving with human activity. In this example, the hunt for bigger game could have been prompted by population growth, caused by human activity (sexual intercourse).

In sum through human activity, new modes of production developed in order to achieve new means, brought upon by new circumstances that man influenced. For example, language which is as “old as consciousness, and is practical consciousness,” (p.51) along with other developments of “moments” or stages in time, and human activity. Was man able to rise out of simple consciousness, aware only to its “immediate sensuous environment” (p. 51)

Competing Notions of Freedom in Marx

In the section titled “Individuals, Class, and Community” (p. 82-86), Marx discusses competing conceptions of freedom and the relation of individuals to larger interactive groups / constructs. Marx points out that the right to, “the undisturbed enjoyment, within certain conditions, of fortuity and chance has up till now been called personal freedom,” (86) but argues that true personal freedom cannot exist until the competitive (i.e. Capitalist) class State is overthrown for a more equal structure. As Marx says, “only in community is personal freedom possible” (83). Marx believes that because we are given our identity through class, and we compete as members of that class against the other classes, especially the ruling class, we are not in a state of true personal freedom. We will always be driven by and held to the struggle of our class against the other classes. As Marx explains, “the class.. achieves existence over against the individuals, so that the latter find their conditions of existence predestined, and hence have their position in life and their personal development assigned to them by their class” (82) . Marx believes that, just as the serfs overthrow the feudal structure to progress towards freedom, so too does the proletariat have to make a drastic organizational change to continue this progress towards true freedom. As Marx puts it, “to assert themselves as individuals, they must overthrow the State” (85). Although we might think of ourselves as individuals acting freely in the current political and socioeconomic structure, we are actually slaves to the class of which we are a member. The eternal conflict between the separate classes keeps us from being free, and from this conflict is where the notion of community evolves as the inevitable solution. Is as long as the classes exist in conflict, competing with each other for more and more property and status, we cannot be free, then the only logical solution to this problem is a structure in which the classes are all equal (or there is only one class of which we are all members, which in the end has the same effect). As Marx puts it, “this subsuming of individuals under definite classes cannot be abolished until a new class has taken shape, which has no long any particular class interest to assert against the ruling class” (83).

It is interesting to think that it might be the case that only when we are all working together for the same collective goal are we truly free. Most conceptions of freedom today are something like the ability to do what one wants when one wants, under no constrictions to anything external. Marx, however, is arguing that it is only through the creation of the ultimate external force, community, that we can achieve true freedom. He says that, “the condition of their existence, labour, and with it all the conditions of existence governing modern society, have become something accidental, something over which they, as separate individuals, have no control, and over which no social organization can give them control” (85), but this seems to be exactly opposed to our notion of government. American society (perhaps the strongest example of a capitalist society in modernity) seems to hold that individuals can come together to create change in our society. Marx seems to believe in a one-way relationship from class / society to the individuals, but we seems to believe in a more reciprocal relationship. I wonder, then, if given a reciprocal relationship between individuals and class, we might be allowed to consider ourselves “free”?

Town to Country

Marx discusses further the division of labor, but with respect to the concepts of town and country. It is precisely through the existing “antagonism” between them that defines human activity and the fact that it precedes and is the basis of human reason or consciousness of any sort. It seems that Marx supposes a relationship between town and country that is inseparable, insofar as there is a transition back and forth between them, and that each knows the other through some type of opposition. The town is equated with landed property, community, and barbarism, which suggests unification amongst the people and labor that is subject to the actual means of production (i.e. the land). The country is merely the opposite; it is characterized by private property, individualism, and civilization, suggesting a separation that on the one hand appreciates and encompasses the implications of the town, and on the other hand transcends that of the town by allowing for a more complex and sophisticated system. The town gradually makes its way through improvement towards industry and ultimately to the phase of country by way of manufacturing and trade. This movement can also be seen as the division of material and mental labor, in which Marx considers exactly the separation of town and country, and to me exactly demonstrates their relationship. I will propose that Marx means mental labor as the rise of intellect or rationality in correspondence to material labor. As material labor is advancing, mental labor is becoming an increasing necessity. Each one serves to mediate the other. Similarly, the town is transforming more into the country. Hence, both parties are striving for agreement.

The idea of the country seems to overpower that of the town, even as the town becomes closer to the ideal of country. The town anew mirrors the country, but remains a part of a larger concept of country. On a very literal sense, I will mention that Marx uses England as an example where trade and manufacture were centralized and created for them a world market (Marx 77), while the town (in some cases, not all) reveres England and attempts to follow their lead. This developing relationship between town and country is, as we move through history, a basic element that is built upon. There is not much, though, to inquire about this aspect of Marx’s account as I have condensed Marx's elaborate relationship between town and country, in which serve to facilitate the manifest of ideas such as property, as well as, in the end revolution.

Is it really a thing? Or is it an illusion?

He begins this section that the private property was once the movable property (ex. Slaves). Property also evolves along the way as our economy grows and our practice changes ("feudal landed property, corporative movable property, capital invested in manufacture, and the modern capital in big industry and universal competition" p.79). With this in mind, if we link these kinds of property in connection to the state, we would find that the "the state has become a separate entity, beside and outside civil society" (p.80). From Marx's POV, the state has gradually become the ruled by the bourgeois ("the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests" p.80).Marx also seems to be arguing that within the state, law has become a tool for the ruling class, and that it only has "just as little as an independent history as religion" (p.81). The most typical Marxist point he draws here is that THE POWERFUL RULES, and that they set the rules of the game (according to their interest) for the less powerful to follow. The evidence he finds is the illusion created where law is based on the free will.

As the result of the will, jus abutendi explains the relationship between people and civil law; it is "the right of using and consuming (also abusing)" (81), a kind of private property where people have the right to (even) dispose it at will. Within this illusion, it "reduces law to mere will" and only becomes a “true property” when it is in transition from one owner to another (81). Because one does not gain any economic values from these “true property”, one has the option to abuse it (and not let others have it), or dispose it (which would then pass the ownership of a “thing” to another).

Moreover, Marx notes that “this juridical illusion… leads… to the position that a man may have a legal title to a thing without really having the thing” (81). Even though the new owner has the jus abutendi after the transition, if the new owner does not have enough capital to cultivate this new “thing” that they gain, it would be useless. One of the obvious examples we can see in US history is when African-Americans were first liberated from being slaves, but then later found themselves being segregated within the society. First, they were liberated (from the Emancipation Proclamation) as if they have legal title to freedom, but the question is, were they really free? Do they really have the thing, namely freedom? Did they really have enough “capital” to “cultivate” this freedom they have (note that some even remain with their owner in the field because they realize they have no capital at all)? Even after Civil Rights, many often blame African-Americans that they do not work hard enough to “cultivate” this freedom they have gain throughout history. Perhaps this juridical illusion still exists today in many aspects in our life, but many might think differently about this nowadays.

Ideologies, Past and Present

After struggling through the readings for Kant and Hegel, I was relieved to come across this quote: “… the ‘liberation’ of ‘man’ is not advanced a single step by reducing philosophy, theology, substance and all the trash to ‘self-consciousness’ and by liberating man from the domination of these phrases, which have never held him in thrall” (p 61). Marx views the philosophical contribution of his predecessors as “dogmatic dreamings and distortions … explained perfectly easily from their practical position in life, their job, and the division of labour” (p 68). That is, the works of Hegel and of Kant stem from their particular role in the division of labor in society. The role of a philosopher, “the thinkers of a class,” presupposes the division of mental and material labor. Implicit in this division is the hegemony of the ruling class’ ideas, and in the case of Hegel, “the hegemony of the spirit in history” (p 67). By grounding the abstractions of consciousness as originating from society’s mode of production, Marx provides an interdisciplinary critique of human history and modern societies.

In Marx’s time period, the production and consumption of a product was readily apparent in a single country. Today, as Marx anticipated, production and consumption activities extend beyond what were once national, geographical, and cultural barriers. This globalization of capitalism is due to the increasing intensification of the division of labor whereby the specialization of labor leads to increased efficiencies in the form of technological advancements to allow for the further accumulation of capital via the expansion of the production, distribution, exchange, and consumer relations (p 43). The shift from an industrial to a service economy in the U.S. is part of a continual process of capital accumulation. The cheap labor of previously colonized countries is now further exploited to produce the assorted manufactured goods we consume in the U.S. The dominance of capitalism is owed to the capital accumulated from colonized countries via the extraction of natural resources as well as the unpaid labor of slaves. Today’s dominance of capitalism is owed to capital accumulation via the credit market, through loans used to pay for housing and education. Therefore the capitalist mode of production has not changed; however, the means of production, the “stages of development in the division of labor,” continuously change to allow for further capital accumulation and expansion.

Any social grievances (social issues of poverty, racism, sexism, healthcare, etc.), ultimately derive from the capitalist mode of production, namely a class based mode of production. And the solution must involve the transformation of the mode of production. The transformation process is described in materialist terms, “to overthrow the existing state of society by a … revolution” (p 55). A transformation of the capitalist mode of production, according to Marx, must disrupt the flow of capital accumulation. The disruption is not achieved by the rallies and protests against austerity measures held at Hunter, for example, which are safely confined to the sidewalk and do not even disrupt the flow of traffic. Collective bargaining rights, by comparison, restricts the exploitation of labor thereby disrupting capital accumulation.

The transformation of the mode of production and the form in which such a transformation should take is difficult for me to grasp. I was born in the Reagan era of neoliberalization, the globalization of capitalism, so it seems impossible to even conceive the communism Marx hints at throughout this section. Still, the critique he offers is invaluable, especially when the capitalist mode of production is assumed to be the best alternative. Therefore I do not mean to contradict Marx’s assertion that “not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history, also of … philosophy and all other types of theory” (p 59). This criticism seems to refer more to idealism, not the dialectical materialism Marx describes.

Marx's Materialism

The reading for today focused almost exclusively Marx's definition of production. Marx explains his conception of production and its aspects – consumption, distribution, exchange – and their relation to society and history. What I found most interesting, especially in light of previous class readings, was his view of, and gripes with, materialism.

In the Theses on Feuerbach, Marx outlines explicitly some of the limitations of all prior materialism – first and foremost being the separation of sensuous object from human activity or practice. For Marx, truth in contemplation alone is inconsequential; our truth is determined by practice. Feuerbach, among others, seems to have a tendency toward abstraction – in attempts to find the truth of a situation, or of society, the materialists have contemplated isolated aspects of the world (e.g. the individual, 'religious sentiment') abstractly, or outside of their relation to the larger whole. Marx argues that it makes no sense to consider the individual, or an other aspect of society, outside of the historical epoch or particular form of society.

In light of these complaints, then, one can see why Marx seems to bolster the traditional 'materialist doctrine' by grounding it historically, economically, socially etc. For him everything is determined historically and socially. Even abstracted concepts cannot be outside of historical parameters. As he explains, using labor as an example, the abstract categories of society (or of any institution) can only be valid for the specific historical conditions to which they belong.

The necessary relation of part to whole comes up throughout the reading in various forms. Particularly in explaining material production, Marx talks about distribution, consumption, and exchange as aspects of the larger whole of production. While each part may be distinguished from the whole, they are all still initiated and determined by production. Furthermore, the problems which arise in generalized abstraction are solved when they are explained with increasing specificity (from Marx's explanation of the uneven development of material production, using Greek art as an example – p. 150). In other words, the whole cannot be understood apart from its relation to its parts.

With Marx, our focus has shifted from the traditional realm of metaphysics, beyond experience, to the totality of human action (i.e “the ensemble of the social relations” [p.122]). The forces that determine history and its phases are the modes of production, political economy, class, etc. - the sum of the relations of society and economy. Marx mentions Hegel by name several times in the reading, and given our reading schedule, the influence of one on the other seems obvious (For instance, the whole-part relationship and historical determinism are large themes in Hegel's writing as well). When Marx writes that “active side [of contemplation?] was developed abstractly by idealism,” (p. 121) I took him to be referring, possibly, to Hegel, but I'm not sure what he's talking about specifically. As mentioned above, we can see general notions in Hegel that seem to have contributed to Marx's thought, but what other ideas might have been developed by idealism that we see in Marx's materialism? It seems like an idealism “which...does not know real, sensuous activity” would be fundamentally unable to contribute a kind of materialism that takes into account activity/practice.

Plans for Monday

Due to my illness and popular demand, we will start working on Marx on Monday. However, I plan to briefly lecture on Hegel at the beginning of the class.

In other words, please keep up with the reading schedule from the syllabus, and bloggers should proceed as though nothing has happened.

I am sorry for these inconveniences, although I imagine some of you are relieved that we are practically done with Hegel. Enjoy your weekend.

AUV

Actions

An interesting sentence on page 153: "Just as every action can be considered under the aspect of its conformity to duty, so too it can be considered under the other aspect of particularity; for, as an action, it is the actuality of the individual."

Hegel, just as he believes that even action can be judged to be in some way a conformation to duty, seems to be saying that an action is always somehow unique to an individual. Anything the individual does in some way reflects his inner realm and is part of the actuality of the individual. Nothing the individual does doesn’t come from himself and his own personality at some level, whatever other external factors might be in play. The individual even comes to know himself through this and know what his own personality is like; if he does something that can objectively be called greedy or ambitious out of feelings of greed or ambition, he knows it to be so through his own actions.

According to Hegel, the individual learns that these things make him happy through this process and so learns that this is his true personality. This is what motivates him to strive for happiness. This also applies to good qualities that are motivated by something more, because even they are enough. Hegel lists inner moral vanity, patting oneself on the back and doing something so that it may make you happy in the future as motivating factors. He also thinks that because duty for duty’s sake is automatic, it therefore is not a reflection on the individual and it is the individual purpose that is actual. The action, if you set aside the duty part of it, has particularity because of that. One thing Hegel writes is that no man is a hero to his valet not because he isn’t actually a hero but because the hero turns to his valet for things that don’t demonstrate his heroism. He turns to the valet for other needs, such as eating, drinking and dressing. According to Hegel, this is likewise how an action and the thoughts behind it can be compartmentalized. +

Hegel in America

In considering our class discussion last Wednesday, I started thinking about the implications of Hegelian community based ethics as a relative system when applied to different cultures environments.

When Hegel paints his picture of the ethical society, with the existence of Divine and Human Law in relatively peaceful co-existence amongst the whole of people, he cites ancient Greece as his prime example. For him, the ancient Greek culture presented the epitome of this system -- each citizen had his/her role and duties, these were well defined, and all there were no singularities so to speak for each individual was a coherent part of a larger ethical substance.

Living under such a system of positive freedom, the citizens were parts of a whole and, roughly speaking, equal in so much as the fact that they could only identify themselves in relation to the whole and the whole could only be identified through them.

With discord and war, the spirit of this ethical substance dies and discord is sown; as seen in Kant's Roman example, no longer is there a whole -- the individuals are now just that, individual singularities. With no duty to guide them, the chaos of negative freedom engrosses them and there are no longer seen as necessary in defining the group or community and no longer does the community or whole need them to identify. Aggregated, the relationship between them is still strained and there is no necessity between them and this opens up the possibility for the Lord of the World, a prince of power who's seat is completely fueled by the negative freedom existent in the group.

Ethics, and power, are thus thrown out of whack. It seems that without the coherent spirit to define them -- and instead simply a negative ethical being in the form of the LOTW to counter or terrorize them -- the individuals lose that sense of duty and identity that previously provided them with the ethical world.

It's fairly clear that Hegel holds a glowing view of Greek society and a less than positive one of the Roman system of stoicism; but as described in class, the Roman system seems much more similar to what we'd consider the 21st Century American society.

Is there a current LOTW, under Hegelian terms? Could that be considered the christian god, considering the state of religiosity in the United States at the moment? Or would it be the government itself, wielding power over an aggregation of citizens whose own opinions are only sometimes reflected in the community?

If writing the Phenomenology today, where would Hegel place us? And what would we learn from it? Would he consider us an ethical nation?

Conscience

Hegel defines morality primarily through duties. Morality is action-oriented and denies teleological pursuit as its development. Conscience, in this scenario, does not become, as it is most often used today, as the guiding principle of morality. It is not personified in the “angel and devil dichotomy on separate shoulders,” as we have come to often recognize it and associate it with. Conscience, for Hegel, is actually a negative phenomenon and is posited against morality, as such. Conscience exists for itself and does not recognize duties; as such, it becomes almost an antithesis for morality itself, and definitely opposed to consciousness.

In terms of actions, upon which morality is based, conscience directs them, and maybe perhaps even the right ones, but not in the same sense that morality does. Conscience makes the error of focusing merely on actions as opposed to duties. A same action that is carried for the mere sake of that action, as opposed to fulfilling a duty, is not moral. This mere action, though mimics the moral action, does not actually fulfill the duty and thus fails to be part of the realm of morality.

Conscience is not posited in an outside being, as morality ends up being projected, but exists for its self and its awareness of that. It is a form of subjectivism. It has something akin to “self-confidence” (though it is odd to think of it that way). This is the distinction between the in-itself and for-itself that Hegel posits. It can be compared to the human and divine law distinction, in some ways. The divine law would be universal and removed, thus making it exist in itself, while the human law is immediate to itself and the society. Conscience would fall on the side of human law, because its importance and relevance is temporary and immediate, but in the big scheme of things, it really does not accomplish much. This comparison will also hold for its relation to morality – they might sometimes be in agreement, but will ultimately diverge on the most important points and are reconcilable.

Conscience, as being for itself, does not surrender to universalism. It is its own being in the highest sense. This is part of the reason that it cannot be moral – because it cannot and would not subjugate itself to anything and morality demands the following of duties. Furthermore, these duties are abstract and pure, thus incompatible with the idea of conscience. Its own self-involvement, in a sense, is what holds it back from becoming either universal or abstract. It is concerned with a very small, circumscribed realm that is removed from such concepts. Conscience cannot cross the boundaries beyond that to become involved in the phenomenon of morality.