An interesting sentence on page 153: "Just as every action can be considered under the aspect of its conformity to duty, so too it can be considered under the other aspect of particularity; for, as an action, it is the actuality of the individual."
Hegel, just as he believes that even action can be judged to be in some way a conformation to duty, seems to be saying that an action is always somehow unique to an individual. Anything the individual does in some way reflects his inner realm and is part of the actuality of the individual. Nothing the individual does doesn’t come from himself and his own personality at some level, whatever other external factors might be in play. The individual even comes to know himself through this and know what his own personality is like; if he does something that can objectively be called greedy or ambitious out of feelings of greed or ambition, he knows it to be so through his own actions.
According to Hegel, the individual learns that these things make him happy through this process and so learns that this is his true personality. This is what motivates him to strive for happiness. This also applies to good qualities that are motivated by something more, because even they are enough. Hegel lists inner moral vanity, patting oneself on the back and doing something so that it may make you happy in the future as motivating factors. He also thinks that because duty for duty’s sake is automatic, it therefore is not a reflection on the individual and it is the individual purpose that is actual. The action, if you set aside the duty part of it, has particularity because of that. One thing Hegel writes is that no man is a hero to his valet not because he isn’t actually a hero but because the hero turns to his valet for things that don’t demonstrate his heroism. He turns to the valet for other needs, such as eating, drinking and dressing. According to Hegel, this is likewise how an action and the thoughts behind it can be compartmentalized. +
The valet example interests me and I wonder if it's not also, to some degree, representative of his idealism.
ReplyDeleteFrom the valet's point of view the man is no hero simply because all direct interactions with the man center around everyday activities; he is not privy to nor does he witness the heroic actions and so the only representation of the man he can process is that of one who needs clothing or sustenance.
The man, witness to the actualization of all of his own actions -- as well as the restraint of nonaction -- is the only one would could, completely, know himself and it is not just the actions but the capability of recognizing them that allows this.
@ Agatha
ReplyDeleteAfter reading your blog it just reminds me of "Actions speaks ouder than words". I think it is true because we like pleasure principle. Things that make us happy and pleasure, we would like to do those things more often. In psychoogy, it is positive reinforcement. When we get good and satisfaction result from our consequences, then we woud like to do those stuffs again and repeatedly. I think in this way, we deveop our personality and adapt to our environment. it is true that action is always unique to an individual. I think this is the reason why, we all are different individual.And capabe of doing this different from one another.
I am not totally clear on Hegel’s concept of duty, but I regard it as something wholly subjective to an individual, but objective for that individual at a given time. Whatever one believes to be their own duty, is their duty. Moral action is the fulfillment of this duty. The immediate problem I see with this is that one’s duty is arbitrary. If one has the inclination to be completely selfish, and has no further convictions, it is one’s duty to be completely selfish. When this person acts selfishly we must admit, under Hegel’s view, that he or she is acting morally. To be sure, many Nazi’s acted in accordance with their own set of values during the holocaust. I believe the same may be said about certain demented serial killers. While it might be difficult to imagine inflicting torture without any convictions or guilt, we have good reason to believe this does occur. Can we say that these people are acting morally? I believe there is something missing in Hegel’s account of duty. Or perhaps, more likely, I am missing that something in Hegel’s writing, which is very, very possible.
ReplyDeleteOn a less extreme note, Duty seems to be a thing which only exists as it is immediately conceived in the mind. For that reason it seems duty may fluctuate throughout the day. Lets say in the morning when I’m full and have change in my pocket I might feel as though it is my duty to help out the homeless, but in the afternoon when I am hungry I am concerned only with my own hunger, and totally disregard the beggars. Must I say it was my duty in the morning to help out the homeless but not in the afternoon? These acts would seem to be considered moral on Hegel’s view. In this context, one which I think is prevalent for most people, duty is sort of a meaningless term. It would be more correct to say simply I felt the urge to help homeless people in the morning. Duty should be a much larger, more meaningful concept. If there is such thing as duty, duty should be something lasting, but even so duty would seem to be merely a strong, lasting inclination or feeling. Is there something genuinely distinct in the concept of duty from that of a minor inclination? Is there a difference besides the degree of intensity or the length of time it is felt? Once again it is very possible I have this all wrong, so let me know.
Personally I am a bit confused about the valet example; especially in Agatha’s notion that Hegel is stating here that it is “likewise how an action and the thoughts behind it can be compartmentalized.” In Hegel’s claim following the reference to the valet as one who sees no man as a hero, he parallels this to the judging consciousness as the “moral valet” (p. 153- 154). In saying this, Hegel is perhaps saying that the judging consciousness acts as the moral valet to the individual in the sense that it is able to separate accordingly an action in terms of singularity and universality. The judging consciousness, like the valet, does not recognize an individual as a hero, though not unaware of the universality of their actions that define them as heroes. They are alike insofar as they act in correspondence to the action given, though the moral valet, or judging consciousness, seems to question the action dubiously. It is able to see the individual distinctly in different lights. Hegel goes on to say that such consciousness is divided, as I have attempted to demonstrate, therefore is itself contemptuous and hypocrisy. Perhaps, Agatha, this is what you mean by the actions and thoughts behind them being compartmentalized.
ReplyDeleteI too get a sense of compartmentalization, but I understood the compartmentalization to stem from the division between the universality and singularity of an action, not as a division between the actions and the thoughts behind the actions. I agree with Janay, the judging consciousness is like the moral valet in that it services the actions of the individual irrespective of the actions’ universal implications. I’m curious about the fascination with the valet, though. It seems that Hegel’s use of the moral valet to describe the judging consciousness is more likely to resonate for people living in an overgrown city where such a large portion of the population is employed to service the lifestyles of the well-heeled. The very many doormen, domestic workers, taxi drivers, escorts, and miscellaneous assistants illustrate the moral valet/judging consciousness of quite a few New Yorkers. Hegel seems to say that the mere acknowledgement of hypocrisy (which results from the division of universality and singularity) seems to cleanse the individual of hypocrisy. However, the only remedy for the existence of the judging consciousness and its inherent “evilness” is “self-forgiveness"? From what I understand of this last section, the religious self-consciousness requires an acknowledgement of the wrong doing of the judging consciousness and its “self-deluded conceit” (p 157). But Hegel’s use of religion to reconcile this division is just too easy, and resembles the recklessness of the singularity he attempts to condemn. Billy notes many examples which Hegel considers the “evilness” of the individuality of the judging consciousness. Yet, Hegel seems to gloss over the historical significance or the moral implications of these actions with a simple confessional.
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