Monday, March 14, 2011
Subject-Object Third Party-ness
It's not my turn to blog until Marx, and so this won't be a full post, but I have a nagging question that has been bothering me as we read Hegel (which has been admittedly dreadful and dense to read). Hegel seems to hold that we need to be aware of others' awareness of us (we are the object to their subject), but how can this awareness be achieved if we can only ever be our own subject and the "in-itself" of objects (and thus the" subject" of other people-objects) is beyond us? Anyone? Bueller? Bueller? Bueller?
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
This question seems very interesting to me. I think Hegel would agree with you that we are the object to their subject. We are not only the object in-itself but also the in-itself that's being subjected to what other people's consciousness inspects into us. Here's the tricky part: the object (us) can change. According to Hegel's dialectic method, we are the object in itself that is in itself, but also exist for others consciousness. Because everything is related to each other, we are aware of what others' consciousness have on us, and that somewhat also shapes the person we are.
ReplyDeleteProfessor also used the Bob example in response to Agatha's question in class last Wednesday, and I think it helped a lot. It was about a random person named Bob, who apparently lost his arm; the question is whether or not he is still the same Bob we know before. Yes and no, he could be the same Bob but he's just not the same Bob anymore.
Oscar, my apologies for not responding to this earlier. Actually, I think it's a great question. But I think that Hegel has presented a very clear answer and that you have ignored it. Which is this: that the phenomenology is an account of the development of cognition. This is the object of this inquiry. But it is also "in" consciousness, like the consciousness that observes it. Therefore, consciousness merely needs to consider either view from its unique relation to the other. That is, the "in itself" of cognition is in consciousness, not outside of it, like other objects.
ReplyDeleteSo the problem isn't as difficult as you suggest it is, in respect of the inquiry of the Phenomenology. Beyond the Phenomenology is another question.
Ahh, okay. I think I get that actually. Thanks for the clarification, professor.
ReplyDelete