Essentially, what Kant talks about here is two ways in which the idea of nature can be approached: we can feel the nature and/or understand it. Nature operates and manifests itself through events (cause and effect) that are bound by law. Law is intrinsic to nature. In everyday life people seem to accept the notion that since nature operates by its own laws, it’s something out there, permanently existing across space and time. The notion “if/when I die, the world will keep running” is prevalent. It’s interesting to think about it, but I think most of the people don’t realize the obvious link between the world of nature, that seems so separate and foreign, and us human beings. So what Kant implies, according to my interpretation, is that nature, separate from mechanisms of our sensibility and reasoning just doesn’t make sense. Knower cognizes known. Known, which are events and processes that we can call nature seems separate from the knower and operate according to its rules and laws, but take the knower out of the picture and the known loses its meaning. Moreover, I think what Kant is saying is that the principles (sensibility and reasoning) by which we know nature also belong to nature itself – they are nature’s some of many laws. “The possibility of experience in general is thus at the same time the universal law of nature, and the principles of the former are themselves the laws of the latter”.
Then there are universal laws of nature, which according to Kant’s proposition can be known without experience. The universal laws of nature (known) lie in our ability to perceive and understand (knower). Then we hit a brick wall, because you can’t go any further by saying that instruments by which we know nature are part of that nature, we can cognize these instruments. The problem is to cognize them we need the very same instruments.
I agree with Ibraim’s point about hitting a brick wall. In addition, it appears to me that Kant set everything up in the beginning of the Prolegomena with the distinction about analytic and synthetic propositions, where he said that "metaphysical cognition must contain nothing but judgments aprior" (section 2a), and synthetic judgment is aprior. If we use this kind of logic, then he has no responsibility or necessity to further explain more about the nature itself, except what’s already given to us [through time and space], otherwise he would be using analytical judgments rather than synthetic. Instead of thinking beyond what's within that nature, Kant merely thinks that it's pointless to further define what's within that given, but rather take them for granted, and build upon the given. So, when people ask about what the ability of nature comes from, he would merely refer back to nature itself, but investigate no further.
ReplyDeleteWell, the purpose of explaining the nature of nature is to show its boundaries, where it ends and the other begins.
ReplyDeleteThe thing is, I think that's what Kant feels as well, it is not quite clear where the sphere of nature (physical world) ends, and sphere of pure concepts and propositions defined by synthetic apriori judgments begin (metaphysics). Sure you can define intuitions, sure you can define concepts of cause and substance. But it doesn't explain the emergence of physical world across the intuitions of space and time. In fact when we start talking about these intuitions in that sense, they, too become part of nature, and now we have to find new ways to define them. Something is missing here. We can't use intuitions to describe what otherwise is so obvious, lively and physical - physical matter around us. Its is what it is, but has no logical ground to be what it is.
The laws of nature exist regardless of whether we know them or not, so I'm not sure that I agree with your idea that "known loses its meaning once you take the knower out of the picture." As you mentioned, the way of life continues once a person dies, thus he is not a necessary condition for nature to exist. But even taken universally, I think very few of us would be hard-pressed to argue that if the entire human species dies out, the nature would no longer function according to the laws that it has now.
ReplyDeleteI think that the universal laws of nature exist regardless of whether they are known (it's not as though they did not exist before we discovered them).
It's not my idea, it's what Kant is trying to say :-)
ReplyDeleteYou see, according to Kant there's no such thing as universal laws of nature apart from mechanisms of sensibility and understanding, which implies a presence of consciousness. In other words, the universal laws of nature exist because there are laws of sensibility and understanding (whether the presence of a human body is necessary for these laws to exist is not clear), that allow nature to manifest itself. Before you can say that the sun goes up and down everyday, you need to be there to say it. Without you being there to witness the sunrise and sunset at least once, or at least having heard of such a thing, this statement doesn't make sense, more so from metaphysical point of view. That's what Kant is implying, I think. The very possibility of us being able to define and categorize nature already implies that we are part of it and two are not separate. I'm not implying, neither does Kant for that matter, that when human body dies, nature dies with it. This statement doesn't make any sense, common sense tells us that in life people die around us all the time, and we, world and nature as a whole continue to function normally despite these deaths.
I think the confusion comes from the fact, that we tend to view our physical bodies and our personalities, as one inseparable entity. If, and I'm only saying if, what it takes to be a human being isn't just limited to a physical body and doesn't die with it, then perhaps Kant's ideas suddenly become a bit easier to grasp
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ReplyDeleteJeanne, let me make a schematic description of your take on Kant's ideas, just to make sure I understand you correctly. So there is nature that operates according to its laws. Then there are we, human beings, which make manifestation of these laws and nature in general possible, by means of faculties of our minds. Kant is not saying that we make nature happen with the power of our minds, but neither is he saying that nature is possible without them. If it is, it quits being nature, for it loses all definitions and qualities, constructed by the faculties of our minds. I guess the point I'm trying to make is that even though nature with its laws might possibly exist objectively somewhere out there, if these laws are not cognizable by our minds and manifested in some way in us(if we are unable to perceive and define them in some way), then the very idea of nature with its laws is nonsense. We can only, then, speak of it as something that just purely is, without any claims about it what so ever. But if that's the case, then wouldn't it mean that at the very basic level, taking the faculties of mind and laws of nature out of picture, nature (whatever it is) and us (whatever we are) are inseparable? This also could be an answer your question about a brain and a body. Brain and body are two of many nature's objects. It's processes are maintained by the very same laws of nature. If a brain is the source of faculties, by which nature manifests itself in consciousness, then nature is not possible without these necessary objects, that make it real. If this is the case, then when human body dies, so should nature, but it doesn't because it gives birth to new objects of brains and bodies, so they can maintain the necessary condition for it to exist (presence of intuitions, faculties and concepts of understanding). I guess the correct way to resolve this issue is to say that concepts of cause and effect are human concepts only, nature is not necessarily bound by them, and they are observed in nature only when we think of them. But then if this is the case, why do we still define nature as nature? The only way to answer this question is to state that we and nature are not possible without each other. Laws of nature lose their meaning without faculties of mind, but the faculties of mind lose their meaning without laws of nature.
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ReplyDeleteKant’s idea of nature lies in his account of transcendental philosophy. In every day life, people may think of nature in a broad, more scientific sense (modern science that is). It seems that what you said about people accepting the notion of nature as something that exists permanently across space and time mostly applies to this way of thinking about nature. Kant makes it clear through his definition of nature that it is not something that is out there because it is exactly what constitutes all of experience. You also said that the notion “if/ when I die, the world will keep running” is prevalent. I do not think that this necessarily applies to what Kant is saying, but I can see how you may have related it to Kant. The relationship that I see in this is that the a priori laws that govern nature are always constant no matter who the “knower” may be. Also I do not think that the principles by which we know nature actually belong to nature itself. Belonging to nature itself are the objects of possible experience, as well as, their conformity to law. The principles (sensibility and reasoning) allow us to make judgements in nature. Though in the following quote you used as evidence, it does seem to be be saying just what you seem to have understood from it.
ReplyDeleteLet me just throw a couple things out there:
ReplyDelete1) The forms of space and time are what shape and make possible experience. For this same reason, they can only be said of experience. But to say that the rules of nature are IN our minds, would be to extend a spatial concept beyond outer experience, no? So it would seem like, for Kant, that could not be said.
2) That being said, the question about the "location" of the principles of pure natural science should be answered. The skeptical question posed by Maria and the radical response by Ibraim are both right, I think. How are these views reconciled with one another?
One of the problems of separating body and mind is that the mind is not a part of the physical world. Even following Kant’s separation, the realm of reason does not possess the experience of nature and natural laws in the way that realm of understanding does. The laws of nature exist in nature and are constant. The recognition of them, postulating them as theorems and testing them is, however, left to the rational beings.
ReplyDeleteAlso, laws can never exist merely in something, especially just an object. Laws are part of actions and cause and effect, I do not think they can even be manifested in inanimate objects.
@Maria
ReplyDeleteIf, as you say, the "laws or nature exist in nature and are constant" and it is merely the recognition of them that falls to us, then that seems to me to fall more in line with something like the Empiricism of Hume and Coherence Theorists.
From what I've understood, Kant is saying that the very way in which we experience the world has time and space (and pure concepts, etc) inherently built into it. He is not saying something about the external world so much as about our minds / consciousness and the way we perceive events.
Hey all,
ReplyDeleteI'm jumping on this a bit late, but there's a few points I wanted to clarify and questions I might be able to answer. Where to begin? I guess I'll start by expanding Prof. Vaught's points.
@Prof. Vaught:
Where is the location of these principles of natrual science? In my understanding of what Kant's trying to say (damn rambling), is that the locations of these principles lie within our minds, they interact with and compose, at least partly through experience, our factulties of mind, and our intuition. My answer leads into my main point.
@Ibraim:
You made some good points in the comments, and almost came to my understanding. When you mentioned that, "If a brain is the source of faculties, by which nature manifests itself in consciousness, then nature is not possible without these necessary objects, that make it real," you hit the crux of my point, but then passed it by. Namely, I am referring to the idea of our consciousness, or more specifically our mental faculties.
What Kant seems to be saying, IMO, is that the concepts we have about nature, all our knowledge, however aquired, is located within our minds. These concepts, produced by our faculties, allow us to understand and interpret nature, and thus the reality around us. It does not seem to follow, however that without these faculties Nature would not exist.
I say this because, as Jeanne and Janay, and yourself pointed out in one sense or another, that our concepts about nature are not possible without the faculties of our minds, but he is NOT saying that the reverse is true.
I understand it in this way, Nature exist regardless of our existence.
As Maria noted, "the laws of nature exists in nature and are constant."
@ Maria: really good point. I would like to expand on this by saying that Kant seems to refer to Nature(the thing in itself) and our undrstanding, interpretation, and knowledge of nature (as well as everything that those things entail i.e; OUR concepts of Nature's "laws") as two distinct things.
Given that, as Janay noted, Kant definition of nature is something that is "out there" and "is exactly what constitutes all of experience." (Janay also noted that Nature's constituting all of experience is precisely why it is something that is "out there.")
@ Janay: I'm not sure if I agree 100% on that point. Maybe it's true for Kant, it might be the case that I misread, but I don't see how it is the case necessarily that something which is inside of us cannot be a source of experience. Perhaps a good example would be just the idea of our "mental lives"; many times it is the case that the way we percieve things changes our experience of a certain situation. Then again, our mental lives are a part of nature, if we regress back to the fact that our mental lives happen in our brains, which are a part of nature. I may have just contradicted and corrected myself there.
Well, eitherway, Janay, I thought your comment made some good points and clarified a lot.
Now, I have some comments towards Jeanne.
ReplyDelete@Jeanne:
In one of your later comments (Feb 20th; last comment)you said that Kant doesn't think that the laws of nature are "out there and [that] our faculties help us make sense of them." I agree, and I think this point further bolsters my point. For me, what this seems to suggest is that the laws of nature are within us, as products of the faculties of our minds.
Also, you proposed one of the problems with Kant's pondering as such: How can the objects be out there, but the laws that govern them be in our heads? I think I may be able to clarify this (or if I have been wrong thus far, and continue to be mistaken, could just further confuse the discussion). Again, going back to my main point, the things in themselves (the objects, or, more relevantly, Nature itself)can be out there, and are out there, regardless of our aknowledgment of them, any understanding, or even our existence as a species. This is because it is the CONCEPTS that are in our heads (by way of our minds' faculties), produced to help us understand and interpret and percieve these objects when or if we ever encounter them. In the case of Nature, it's obvious that we encounter at a constant basis. Still, Nature (in virtue of its' being discussed as a thing in and of itself) is independent of our interaction with it, whatever that may be. The concepts that our faculties produce ( one of which may be the "laws" of nature ) are our mind's attempt to understand the world around us. They are tools for our human purpose. It does not follow, at least I cannot see how, that because we depend on these concepts in order for the IDEA of Nature and its laws to be made manifest in our reality and perception, that Nature must then be reliant on our existence or be in our collective consciousness in order to exist.
And this I can direct @ Ibraim:
ReplyDeleteYou mentioned in one of your comments that,"Kant is not saying that we make nature happen with the power of our minds, but neither is he saying nature is possible without them. If it is, it quits being nature, for it loses all definitons and qualities, constructed by the facultis of our minds."
Sure, the CONCEPT may become extinct were we to forget it, but I don't agree that it would "quit being nature." Here I like to make an example of the Library at Alexandria to clarify: You rest your claim that nature would quit being nature were this the case on the notion that w/o our faculties, it would "lose[s] all definition and qualities, constructed by the faculties of our mind." In my understanding, your quote holds the answer within it, it only needs to be expanded. As you probably know, the burning of the Library at Alexandria was a catastrophic destruction and elimination of the "known world's" most precious sources of knowledge and wisdom. (This burning has been linked directly to the fall of culture and the Grecian philosophical tradition, and in turn, the advent of the Middle Ages.) But I digress, my point is that even though the only sources (in most cases) of the knowledge in the books that were destroyed could have only been found in those books. So, in our terms, the CONCEPTS were gone, destroyed. But their reality was far from extinct. We needed only to relearn, reintuit, rediscover what had been eliminated from our collective knowledge. And while many secrets are still mysteries, we have rediscovered many pieces of knowledge once thought to have been lost forever. So it is with all CONCEPTS of the mind, which as you rightly pointed out are produced, "by means of faculties of our minds." To conclude this point, just because all definitions and qualities are lost to our minds, they are not lost. Moreover, these definitions and qualities are concepts of our minds, created for OUR PURPOSES.
Such concepts, as Kant notes, are nothing more than representations. We can trust them as we trust experience, but what they represent (the thing in and of itself), we may very well never hope to know. Definitions and qualities do not provide us with the pure essense of things. That is why, for Kant, and in my understanding, while the concepts that our faculties create are essential for our understanding and knowledge of this world, they do not even seem to interact with Nature (the thing in and of itself) in any significant way, outside of our purposes. In particular, and more to my point, our concepts of Nature have no bearing on the existence OR the reality of Nature at all.
I could be mistaken. From what I recall, it was brought up that Kant negates any Platonist notion of Forms, so I could be completely off base, as I am, in some sense, talking about Forms. If it is the case that Kant is against this school of thought, then perhaps he has made a distinction somewhere between the Form (as understood in a Platonist sense) and as he terms it "the thing itself."
That's a few quarters more than my two cents. I hope it makes sense though. :]
So someone today mentioned Kant's Moral Philosophy and how it didn't seem to coincide with his Philosophy regarding nature. Could someone who is familiar with his moral philosophy explain/try to explain to me how he can distinguish from Good/Evil. If, on the most basic level, space/time are the tools to perceiving our reality, how do we have apriori and aposteriori concepts which seem to be based on intangible societal constructs?
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