The soul is the thinking self. It exists in the sphere of reason and thus is part of those cognitions and perception that cannot be proven through experience. However, also, it differs from the rest of those propositions in the sense that it is an empty, inconsequential (as in does not a serve as a basis for future propositions and the build up of further ideas) concept merely in itself. Drawing from this idea, Kant proves that the soul cannot be proven to continue to exist after death. The persistence (continuation) of a thing can be proven through experience, thus it needs to be a cognition of understanding. Because the cognitions of reason can only be refuted on a purely logical basis, through the subjective investigation of reason itself (§42). Yet if the soul is accepted and treated as a substance, it can no longer even contend to be in the realm of reason, firstly, and secondly to the possibility of existing beyond death, in the place where there is no longer any experience. This leads to the conclusion that soul’s continuation through life can be proven and only barely, but not after death, as we have no experience past then (at least, perhaps, not in the realm of understanding), and, ironically enough, that is the only part of the persistence of the soul that any of us care to prove or consider (§48). This leads us to the same monumental problem of Descartes, kind of. We cannot be creatures of the two realms simultaneously and exist in both. Why do we posit a soul’s existence at all instead of mere reason if we cannot differentiate the two in any significant and meaningful way?
On a different note, the idea of natural law makes an appearance in this part once again. The natural law is now permanent and unchangeable. In the discussion of necessity and human freedom, the natural stays constant regardless of the rational forces acting upon or within it. While the main discussion is on the concept of freedom and the antimony related to it, the role of nature is significant here. Freedom itself stems from nature in the sense that it is able to act from rationality and only in reference to a specific object. However, freedom is also curtailed by nature because nature sets limits to the actions that a rational being can perform. The idea of constant laws of nature enters here is that when it comes down to it, while the rational being might be acting rationally or not or from a rational basis and sound analysis and examination of the situation or not, the nature itself is unchanged and mostly uninfluenced by those actions – its law are definitely not.
In response to your question of why Kant posits a soul at all if we cannot differentiate the two in any significant and meaningful way, I would say that the soul is significantly different from reason in exactly that we cannot say anything meaningful about it other than to posit its existence. It is the logical equivalent of the "thing in itself", but subjective as opposed to objective. What I mean is that just as there is a thing in itself for every possible object of experience that correlates to the experience (which we know and can say meaningful things about), there must (again, by logic) be a subjective thing itself that is doing the perceiving and having the experiences.
ReplyDeleteMaria, I agree with the idea that the role of nature is significant in this part. Nature and freedom are two different concepts, nature is what is known through appearances while freedom is the unknown. Nature can be understood through sensibility (space and time) while freedom cannot. Yet Kant says they are compatible. Like you said " freedom is.. curtailed by nature because nature sets limits to the actions that a rational being can perform". I think this idea can be seen through Kant's mentioning of constant laws. Constant laws are the basis for natural necessity and thus must be universal. This section sounded to me a lot like Kant's moral philosophy I don't know if you have read any of his work on that field but it was helpful in order to understand.
ReplyDeleteBuilding on what Oscar wrote - I, too, was/am thinking of Kant's idea of a soul as substance as being analogous to his idea of the thing-in-itself. However, while he's very vehement in his insistence on the existence of the thing-in-itself and its relationship to appearances (arguing against being classified as Idealism), earlier in the Prolegomena, there is not the same sense of necessity in his description of the soul. He seems simply to state the conditions for which we might posit the existence of an absolute subject ( 'I am,' etc.), without really placing too much importance on its parameters. He goes on to say that while we may designate this as a substance, it's really of no consequence if it has no persistence - but a proof of persistence is limited to the "purposes of experience."
ReplyDeleteThis might, actually, just be the same as the thing-in-itself (the existence of which we can posit based on appearances, but of which we can say nothing), but described in a different tone.
It's a minor point, I guess, and perhaps I'm very wrong, but maybe worth thinking about.
This is the first time I am reading the posts, so the reply is meant to continue my thought in class.
ReplyDeleteI understand that fundamentally soul and reason can be thought of as two different things and even more so when the soul is something that we can have no knowledge of. The soul serves kind of as a "miscellaneous" category where everything that we do not completely understand or cannot explain. I can definitely imagine in the future as more things get explained and as psychology is developed, the idea of the soul will shrink. The current position it holds, I think, is a placeholder for what we do not understand. My point is that why create it just to make ourselves feel better by saying that we know what it is, when we clearly do not, rather than just admitting that it is something that we currently cannot explain.
For Kant freedom is most important insofar as it allows for morality. Without freedom, no act may have a moral value. As he has established, the world of appearances, the world of nature, is determined by laws and is therefore necessary. The noumena underlying the appearances, though, may in fact be free in themselves, although even this is merely speculative. Even granted that this is true, what follows from it? If the noumena is free in itself, not in relation to appearances, what is free to do? As human beings, we may only make moral judgments based on phenomena, there is no other way to evaluate morality. If I ,as a thing in itself (the soul), am free, but only in the realm of noumena, I have no way of properly functioning, of using my freedom. Free acts of persons are meaningful only with respect to phenomena in the world of appearances. Perhaps the world of phenomena correctly represents the world of noumena, and in this case my “free” actions would correctly morally correspond to the “real world” of noumena, but if this is the case, then it cannot be true that the noumena may be contingent, while the phenomena necessary, because a direct correlation between the two would be necessary. This last problem is what I brought up at the end of my blog post from the 21st.
ReplyDeleteSo Kant argues that we cannot know that the soul is immortal because the persistence of a thing can be proven through experience and we have no experience of the soul (past a certain point, that is. In this case, death). If this argument is accepted, wouldn't that be a good reason for doubting the existence of God, too? Couldn't you apply it to the other things Kant discusses? You could use this as a pretty good argument for atheism. Or, if not atheism towards all deities, at least doubt or disbelief of the infinite immortal omnipresent God of the Abrahamic religions. We cannot experience God, according to Kant's own admission. We cannot know that he had no beginning and will have no end. We can't know that he always existed and will always exist. We cannot believe that he exists everywhere. Just as we can never know that the universe is infinite, by the same token, we can't believe that God is infinite. So why does he take God's existence and infinity for granted in his philosophy but acknowledges that infinity is problematic in another case? Or is there something that I am missing here?
ReplyDeleteIn response with Maria’s post and what was discussed in class. One can conclude that Kant opposed Descartes’ claim that the soul (the thinking self) is a substance that is infinite and endures, even after death. In contrast, Kant’s perspective on the “soul” as it relates to our physical form (body), surpasses or transcends what is knowable to humans. Still, Kant writes “it does appear as if we have something substantial in the consciousness of our self (the thinking self), and indeed have it in immediate intuition; for all the predicates of inner sense are referred to the I as subject, and this I cannot be thought as the predicate of some other subject” (§ 46).
ReplyDeleteIn reading Kant’s quote (above), at the very least, one can conclude that there is some validity in the determination of the "I" or "soul" as a substance. On the other hand, Kant sees a flaw in the way characteristics of “I” which are associated with performing their own distinct functions, and permit the unity necessary for experience, are presented as hallmarks of something pre-given to intuition. Quite the opposite, Kant explains by no means is the “I” ever provided to our intuition. Although the “I” “cannot itself be the predicate of any other thing, just as little can it be a determinate concept of an absolute object.” (§ 46).Therefore, “I” as a soul is beneficial as a substratum that makes experience possible. As a concept though, “soul” lacks the criterion to withstand persistence, making the claim that the "soul is immortal" void.
@Agatha -
ReplyDeleteI may be simplifying things -- or simply misinterpreting Kant and our professor -- but I'd think Kant's accounts of reason and causality would not directly speak to the existence of god or infinity. I think you're framing the question wrong.
By recognizing the boundaries of our knowledge and the fact that there are some things we cannot know we allow ourselves the ability to discuss those things we cnnot know.
Sounds weird, I know, but bear with me. Let's use the notion of infinity as an example:
We cannot experience infinity, it is simply beyond our capabilities. And yet we have this notion of infinity and do rely on it in certain sciences. How?
Well, we understand the finite. We can experience it. If I draw a straight line on a piece of paper I can experience its finiteness.
Now let's say I draw another perfect straight line, parallel to the first. Again, I can see and recognize that this line is finite.
Given these two lines I know that if I added an inch to each they would remain parallel. Or if I added a mile. Or one thousand miles. Never would these lines cross.
This experience tells me that in a hypothetical situation, should they expand to infinity, they would never cross. This does not mean infinity exists nor that it doesn't; it simply provides a framework and a concept which I may use to explain and understand.
Does that make sense?
In response to the question of Maria's post about soul.
ReplyDeleteWhy do we need to speak of a soul when we dont have any evidence that it exist? Why do we need to speak of anything that we don't have direct material evidence? If we only spoke of facts and things that we can prove empirically, world would have been such a boring place to live, wouldn't it? Imagination describes things that don't exist and result in various works of art such as stories and paintings, however they dont get disregarded, on the contrary sometimes they are valued much more then the most real things.
What I took from Kant’s idea of freedom, is the question of what it constitutes, that experience and our capacity for reason are not dependent on cause and effect, hence are not restricted to time and space. Meaning, that our will to cause actions cannot be regulated to any single moment of time. In Freedom our ability to reason is not dependent on the experience we accumulate, hence is out side synthetic thinking. Our reason takes the form of “practical” and only in this way can it be given action that is not causal to the effect and yet necessary. While, nature, a pure a priori concept which constitutes (Laws) of causality and necessity. Freedom is not subjugated to the limits of those laws, is restrained by limits to knowledge it continues to seek what it cannot possibly know.
ReplyDelete(This is a little off topic from Maria's post, but...)
ReplyDelete@ Billy
your mention about how appearance plays a role in morality reminds me of Plato's Ring of Gyges.
In Kant's Groundwork [his work on morality], he shows that he believes that morality is the law which requires universality & necessity, and for those two reason can it govern the world of nature. In addition, Kant's objective account of morality is based on the good will and moral obligation, but not freedom. Kant also seems to give zero significance to those inevitable speculative ideas such as God, soul, freedom, world in his morality. So, I think Kant would agree with you that morality can only survive in the realm of the phenomena, where it is governed by the law of nature [namely universality and necessity], but it can never be interfered by what lies in the noumena, or else morality cannot survive. I do not think it is possible that phenomena and noumena can have a direct correlation since they are two contradictory terms since phenomena has appearance, whereas the latter does not.
I suppose "noumena is free in itself" in the sense that the "thing in itself" is free in itself, as freedom is free in itself?
@ Ying
ReplyDeleteKant's moral philosophy is not based on freedom because he takes it for granted, it is very much dependent on freedom though.
The argument for freedom (though it is identical for God), is that there can be no philosophy of metaphysics without freedom, as everything would be pre-determined. (The same goes for God and morality.)
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure what the connection between imagination and the value/appreciation of art and the existence of the soul.
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ReplyDeleteto Maria.
ReplyDeleteSoul is not a substance of physical matter, but it can be a substance of fantasy or imagination. You can argue that there is no empirical proof that it exists, but it exists in the minds of people. People think about it, people talk about it. The very fact that people are so curious about it gives it a certain degree of reality, doesn't it? What I'm trying to say is that the reason why people have urge to talk about soul, although they can't prove the existence of it, is the same reason why people have urge to paint, compose music, write books. Its about what's possible, not what's actual, for what is actual is already known and therefore limited. Body is actual, soul is possible. Body is constrained by laws of nature, soul is not. The musical instrument is limited by its design, but music that comes out of it can be without boundaries. I'm just answering your question of why people insist on talking about soul, when it is evident that it doesn't exist :-)