The reading for today focused almost exclusively Marx's definition of production. Marx explains his conception of production and its aspects – consumption, distribution, exchange – and their relation to society and history. What I found most interesting, especially in light of previous class readings, was his view of, and gripes with, materialism.
In the Theses on Feuerbach, Marx outlines explicitly some of the limitations of all prior materialism – first and foremost being the separation of sensuous object from human activity or practice. For Marx, truth in contemplation alone is inconsequential; our truth is determined by practice. Feuerbach, among others, seems to have a tendency toward abstraction – in attempts to find the truth of a situation, or of society, the materialists have contemplated isolated aspects of the world (e.g. the individual, 'religious sentiment') abstractly, or outside of their relation to the larger whole. Marx argues that it makes no sense to consider the individual, or an other aspect of society, outside of the historical epoch or particular form of society.
In light of these complaints, then, one can see why Marx seems to bolster the traditional 'materialist doctrine' by grounding it historically, economically, socially etc. For him everything is determined historically and socially. Even abstracted concepts cannot be outside of historical parameters. As he explains, using labor as an example, the abstract categories of society (or of any institution) can only be valid for the specific historical conditions to which they belong.
The necessary relation of part to whole comes up throughout the reading in various forms. Particularly in explaining material production, Marx talks about distribution, consumption, and exchange as aspects of the larger whole of production. While each part may be distinguished from the whole, they are all still initiated and determined by production. Furthermore, the problems which arise in generalized abstraction are solved when they are explained with increasing specificity (from Marx's explanation of the uneven development of material production, using Greek art as an example – p. 150). In other words, the whole cannot be understood apart from its relation to its parts.
With Marx, our focus has shifted from the traditional realm of metaphysics, beyond experience, to the totality of human action (i.e “the ensemble of the social relations” [p.122]). The forces that determine history and its phases are the modes of production, political economy, class, etc. - the sum of the relations of society and economy. Marx mentions Hegel by name several times in the reading, and given our reading schedule, the influence of one on the other seems obvious (For instance, the whole-part relationship and historical determinism are large themes in Hegel's writing as well). When Marx writes that “active side [of contemplation?] was developed abstractly by idealism,” (p. 121) I took him to be referring, possibly, to Hegel, but I'm not sure what he's talking about specifically. As mentioned above, we can see general notions in Hegel that seem to have contributed to Marx's thought, but what other ideas might have been developed by idealism that we see in Marx's materialism? It seems like an idealism “which...does not know real, sensuous activity” would be fundamentally unable to contribute a kind of materialism that takes into account activity/practice.
Perhaps I am missing something crucial about Marx’s account because I can openly admit that I am probably the only one who does not yet appreciate what he aims to overcome, partly because it is not suggesting anything radical. I think Professor Vaught is right to consider him a nerd. It is somewhat interesting, though mostly tedious, as he draws out the concept of production and its interrelations with distribution, consumption, and exchange as a means to laying out history and society. He uses the common idea of the “whole-part relationship” as Ravi mentioned, to link these concepts, describing them as “different aspects of one unit” (p. 139). He seems to be very heavily concerned with “activity” as oppose to the objects of activity, which is precisely what he is demonstrating with this account of production and its role in political economy. I agree that idealism as referred to in the text is not compatible with Marx’s materialism. His materialism seems to be very critical of it, which makes sense considering Marx’s account is based on concepts that are more concrete and can be traced at a particular point in history and society.
ReplyDeleteHello Janay,
ReplyDeleteThe way that I understood it, it seemed like Marx had a similar criticism of Hegel/Idealists as Hegel had for Kant. Whereas Hegel questioned the separation of experience/the object/cognition, Marx questions the separation of activity or practice from abstracted theory. I don't think I'm representing either critique as well as other classmates might, but I think that Marx hopes to overcome, essentially, the problems or shortcomings of his predecessors. It may not seem to radical, but we've moved from attempting to find necessary truth beyond experience (with Kant), to only finding valuable truth in human activity (with Marx).
To your point Ravi, earlier today I was re-reading the History: Fundamental Conditions section and I recognized that Marx states here (a little more clearly I believe) your point that “Marx questions the separation of activity or practice from abstracted theory”. Once mental and physical labor is separated among the society, Marx describes how consciousness begins to conceive idealisms such as “Specters” “bonds” “the higher being” (pg. 52); this is another obvious jab at Hegel and of course later in the Fauerbach: Philosophic, and Real, Liberation section he explicates this theory clearer, but it also clearly reinforces Marx’s disdain for abstract philosophies. I’d consider (if I was thinking like a Marxist) abstraction-centered theories as another ruling-class ideology all though I don’t remember if Marx specifically relates the two.
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