In Problem III, Kierkegaard -- writing as JdS -- addresses the notion indicated in his nom de plume, that of silence and its role in faith by focusing on Abraham's silence to his friends and family as undertook the journey to sacrifice Isaac.
To do so, JdS investigates other literary and historical figures and their actions. Of particular interest to me was the inclusion of Faust, the famed German figure -- scientist and magician who sold his soul to the devil.
JdS tells us that Faust epitomized the notion of the doubter, an "apostate of the spirit who goes the way of the flesh." His doubt is so powerful, so terrifying, that were it unleashed it would cause those in its path to tremble in fear.
Faust, like Abraham, stays silent. He does this by choice, recognizing the chaos his doubt would cause. But does the same apply to Abraham?
So is Faust a Knight of Faith? It seems the parallel of silence indicates more than just their constraint; both would be condemned by ethics because their refusal to speak, their refusal to acknowledge the universal via speech[97]. The tragic hero, as we've seen, makes his sacrifice FOR the universal[99] instead, so I think Faust would transcend that identity.
But this brings to mind something we also discussed in class, and something that the discussion caused me to wonder. The ineffable, unintelligible movement of faith, of moving through the universal to the singular individual, is not something that can be spoken or even understood by man's reason. The Knight of Faith is silent, but seemingly not by choice -- it's simply an attribute of being a Knight of Faith, a property but not a willful action.
Faust, on the other hand, chooses to remain silent, for fear of the effect his doubt would have. This fear, seemingly related to the anxiety of faith, differs in its choice. Abraham did not choose to remain silent; the idea of speaking to his faith was not one that even crossed his mind, it was not an option, it was just an effect of his faith[101].
So does Faust fail the Knight of Faith test? And furthermore -- another question I've been pondering -- can one who recognizes and acknowledges the nature of faith, as described by JdS, even become a Knight of Faith? Or does the simple act of reading JdS, the cognition of acknowledging faith's nature, make it impossible for the reader to ever become a true Knight of Faith?
Who would you say recognizes the nature of faith? I ask because your last question assumes that we understand the knight of faith as well as the knight of infinite resignation enough so that we seek to go further. Yet sections of this book, especially the epilogue, criticize this tendency.
ReplyDeleteThe epilogue ends with a story of Heraclitus the obscure, whose cryptic writing is analogous to the antithetical narratives that result in Kierkegaard’s use of a pseudonym. The significance of Heraclitus’s actions was undermined by his disciple who sought to go beyond where Heraclitus left off, and instead is considered to have digressed or even regressed somewhat.
JdS, and maybe even Kierkegaard, say we are unable to understand the movement of faith because it is impossible for us to understand the ineffable through a mere reading. And since we have yet to comprehend the struggles with faith described in the book, we feel urged to ask questions that might be answered through our own struggle with faith.
@Silvia --
ReplyDeleteI'm a little torn on this issue, divided if you will; on the one hand, by JdS/Kierkegaard's reckoning we can't really understand the movement of faith from an external point of view, it would seem. The KoF can't explain it to us -- specifically because of its ineffable, unintelligible nature -- and it is, by its very definition, an private relationship and duty to God.
But on the other hand we will strive toward that movement of faith, inspired by stories like Abraham's. And while we cannot see Abraham's thoughts we can, seeing the story as a whole, see that he was a man of faith -- because of the outcome. To do so, however, we have to imagine the conflict or anxiety he experienced.
In such analysis, and by applying rationality to the notion of faith -- even just by contemplating it -- I'd think that we negate our abilities to actually experience or engage it, however.
Should we be approached by God, somehow or someway, and asked to enter into a covenant with him and or to engage in some post-ethical activity, wouldn't we pause to consider this and wonder if a) it was actually a demonic act or b) whether or not it was truly god?
And in doing so, don't we close the door to faith simply by having that level of doubt?
@ Dan-I don't necessarily think that by reading JdS's account of faith we shut off any possibility to our acquisition of faith. Since we have no clue what the process which leads us to attaining faith would entail, I would think that the answer to this question lies somewhere in there. As frustrating as this rationale seems, I think back to your notion that any attempt to apply rationality to faith is dubious. Furthermore, it would seem that if we were not lucky enough to attain the ineffable, by virtue of the absurd understanding of faith which a KOF would have, it wouldn't be the worst thing in the world right? though we should all strive to attain faith, JdS repeatedly stresses that he thinks that there are very few people that are capable of the faith that he is describing and that a life of Infinite Resignation is still a very respectable life.
ReplyDelete