Due to my illness and popular demand, we will start working on Marx on Monday. However, I plan to briefly lecture on Hegel at the beginning of the class.
In other words, please keep up with the reading schedule from the syllabus, and bloggers should proceed as though nothing has happened.
I am sorry for these inconveniences, although I imagine some of you are relieved that we are practically done with Hegel. Enjoy your weekend.
AUV
Wednesday, March 30, 2011
Monday, March 28, 2011
Actions
An interesting sentence on page 153: "Just as every action can be considered under the aspect of its conformity to duty, so too it can be considered under the other aspect of particularity; for, as an action, it is the actuality of the individual."
Hegel, just as he believes that even action can be judged to be in some way a conformation to duty, seems to be saying that an action is always somehow unique to an individual. Anything the individual does in some way reflects his inner realm and is part of the actuality of the individual. Nothing the individual does doesn’t come from himself and his own personality at some level, whatever other external factors might be in play. The individual even comes to know himself through this and know what his own personality is like; if he does something that can objectively be called greedy or ambitious out of feelings of greed or ambition, he knows it to be so through his own actions.
According to Hegel, the individual learns that these things make him happy through this process and so learns that this is his true personality. This is what motivates him to strive for happiness. This also applies to good qualities that are motivated by something more, because even they are enough. Hegel lists inner moral vanity, patting oneself on the back and doing something so that it may make you happy in the future as motivating factors. He also thinks that because duty for duty’s sake is automatic, it therefore is not a reflection on the individual and it is the individual purpose that is actual. The action, if you set aside the duty part of it, has particularity because of that. One thing Hegel writes is that no man is a hero to his valet not because he isn’t actually a hero but because the hero turns to his valet for things that don’t demonstrate his heroism. He turns to the valet for other needs, such as eating, drinking and dressing. According to Hegel, this is likewise how an action and the thoughts behind it can be compartmentalized. +
Hegel, just as he believes that even action can be judged to be in some way a conformation to duty, seems to be saying that an action is always somehow unique to an individual. Anything the individual does in some way reflects his inner realm and is part of the actuality of the individual. Nothing the individual does doesn’t come from himself and his own personality at some level, whatever other external factors might be in play. The individual even comes to know himself through this and know what his own personality is like; if he does something that can objectively be called greedy or ambitious out of feelings of greed or ambition, he knows it to be so through his own actions.
According to Hegel, the individual learns that these things make him happy through this process and so learns that this is his true personality. This is what motivates him to strive for happiness. This also applies to good qualities that are motivated by something more, because even they are enough. Hegel lists inner moral vanity, patting oneself on the back and doing something so that it may make you happy in the future as motivating factors. He also thinks that because duty for duty’s sake is automatic, it therefore is not a reflection on the individual and it is the individual purpose that is actual. The action, if you set aside the duty part of it, has particularity because of that. One thing Hegel writes is that no man is a hero to his valet not because he isn’t actually a hero but because the hero turns to his valet for things that don’t demonstrate his heroism. He turns to the valet for other needs, such as eating, drinking and dressing. According to Hegel, this is likewise how an action and the thoughts behind it can be compartmentalized. +
Hegel in America
In considering our class discussion last Wednesday, I started thinking about the implications of Hegelian community based ethics as a relative system when applied to different cultures environments.
When Hegel paints his picture of the ethical society, with the existence of Divine and Human Law in relatively peaceful co-existence amongst the whole of people, he cites ancient Greece as his prime example. For him, the ancient Greek culture presented the epitome of this system -- each citizen had his/her role and duties, these were well defined, and all there were no singularities so to speak for each individual was a coherent part of a larger ethical substance.
Living under such a system of positive freedom, the citizens were parts of a whole and, roughly speaking, equal in so much as the fact that they could only identify themselves in relation to the whole and the whole could only be identified through them.
With discord and war, the spirit of this ethical substance dies and discord is sown; as seen in Kant's Roman example, no longer is there a whole -- the individuals are now just that, individual singularities. With no duty to guide them, the chaos of negative freedom engrosses them and there are no longer seen as necessary in defining the group or community and no longer does the community or whole need them to identify. Aggregated, the relationship between them is still strained and there is no necessity between them and this opens up the possibility for the Lord of the World, a prince of power who's seat is completely fueled by the negative freedom existent in the group.
Ethics, and power, are thus thrown out of whack. It seems that without the coherent spirit to define them -- and instead simply a negative ethical being in the form of the LOTW to counter or terrorize them -- the individuals lose that sense of duty and identity that previously provided them with the ethical world.
It's fairly clear that Hegel holds a glowing view of Greek society and a less than positive one of the Roman system of stoicism; but as described in class, the Roman system seems much more similar to what we'd consider the 21st Century American society.
Is there a current LOTW, under Hegelian terms? Could that be considered the christian god, considering the state of religiosity in the United States at the moment? Or would it be the government itself, wielding power over an aggregation of citizens whose own opinions are only sometimes reflected in the community?
If writing the Phenomenology today, where would Hegel place us? And what would we learn from it? Would he consider us an ethical nation?
When Hegel paints his picture of the ethical society, with the existence of Divine and Human Law in relatively peaceful co-existence amongst the whole of people, he cites ancient Greece as his prime example. For him, the ancient Greek culture presented the epitome of this system -- each citizen had his/her role and duties, these were well defined, and all there were no singularities so to speak for each individual was a coherent part of a larger ethical substance.
Living under such a system of positive freedom, the citizens were parts of a whole and, roughly speaking, equal in so much as the fact that they could only identify themselves in relation to the whole and the whole could only be identified through them.
With discord and war, the spirit of this ethical substance dies and discord is sown; as seen in Kant's Roman example, no longer is there a whole -- the individuals are now just that, individual singularities. With no duty to guide them, the chaos of negative freedom engrosses them and there are no longer seen as necessary in defining the group or community and no longer does the community or whole need them to identify. Aggregated, the relationship between them is still strained and there is no necessity between them and this opens up the possibility for the Lord of the World, a prince of power who's seat is completely fueled by the negative freedom existent in the group.
Ethics, and power, are thus thrown out of whack. It seems that without the coherent spirit to define them -- and instead simply a negative ethical being in the form of the LOTW to counter or terrorize them -- the individuals lose that sense of duty and identity that previously provided them with the ethical world.
It's fairly clear that Hegel holds a glowing view of Greek society and a less than positive one of the Roman system of stoicism; but as described in class, the Roman system seems much more similar to what we'd consider the 21st Century American society.
Is there a current LOTW, under Hegelian terms? Could that be considered the christian god, considering the state of religiosity in the United States at the moment? Or would it be the government itself, wielding power over an aggregation of citizens whose own opinions are only sometimes reflected in the community?
If writing the Phenomenology today, where would Hegel place us? And what would we learn from it? Would he consider us an ethical nation?
Saturday, March 26, 2011
Conscience
Hegel defines morality primarily through duties. Morality is action-oriented and denies teleological pursuit as its development. Conscience, in this scenario, does not become, as it is most often used today, as the guiding principle of morality. It is not personified in the “angel and devil dichotomy on separate shoulders,” as we have come to often recognize it and associate it with. Conscience, for Hegel, is actually a negative phenomenon and is posited against morality, as such. Conscience exists for itself and does not recognize duties; as such, it becomes almost an antithesis for morality itself, and definitely opposed to consciousness.
In terms of actions, upon which morality is based, conscience directs them, and maybe perhaps even the right ones, but not in the same sense that morality does. Conscience makes the error of focusing merely on actions as opposed to duties. A same action that is carried for the mere sake of that action, as opposed to fulfilling a duty, is not moral. This mere action, though mimics the moral action, does not actually fulfill the duty and thus fails to be part of the realm of morality.
Conscience is not posited in an outside being, as morality ends up being projected, but exists for its self and its awareness of that. It is a form of subjectivism. It has something akin to “self-confidence” (though it is odd to think of it that way). This is the distinction between the in-itself and for-itself that Hegel posits. It can be compared to the human and divine law distinction, in some ways. The divine law would be universal and removed, thus making it exist in itself, while the human law is immediate to itself and the society. Conscience would fall on the side of human law, because its importance and relevance is temporary and immediate, but in the big scheme of things, it really does not accomplish much. This comparison will also hold for its relation to morality – they might sometimes be in agreement, but will ultimately diverge on the most important points and are reconcilable.
Conscience, as being for itself, does not surrender to universalism. It is its own being in the highest sense. This is part of the reason that it cannot be moral – because it cannot and would not subjugate itself to anything and morality demands the following of duties. Furthermore, these duties are abstract and pure, thus incompatible with the idea of conscience. Its own self-involvement, in a sense, is what holds it back from becoming either universal or abstract. It is concerned with a very small, circumscribed realm that is removed from such concepts. Conscience cannot cross the boundaries beyond that to become involved in the phenomenon of morality.
Tuesday, March 22, 2011
Antinomy of the Moral Spirit
The shape of moral spirit has now taken the place of ethical spirit and a new conflict emerges. The conflict or “disharmony” that comprises the moral view of the world is between pure moral action, as realized individuality, and nature, as the singularity of and oneness with abstract purpose. The unity of both is a requirement of reason (114-115). Yet, the completion of this unity is considered an unending progression, an “absolute task,” which is never actually realized (117). The completion of this unity is not of interest to Hegel because it leads to a series of contradictions. These contradictions, however, seem pertinent to some modern day issues. So I’m going to resist the urge to summarize the rest of this section and attempt to examine the contradictions of the moral spirit – the antinomy of the moral worldview.
The antinomy of the moral view of the world states, "There is no morally complete, actual self-consciousness; there is no morally actual self-consciousness." Self-certainty of moral self-consciousness - the requirement of reason - is a unity of duty (pure knowledge, moral action) and actuality (existence, nature). The immediate individual being is pure knowledge and action, and this unity is the true objective reality. The contradictions occur when moral consciousness is not self-certain of itself, when duty distinguishes itself from actuality, when there is a separation of the in-itself from the being for-itself (121-123).
The dissonance of the antinomy seems pretty easy to detect today. Societies based on a market-driven economy provide more examples of dissonance than of harmony. Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” metaphor used to justify the free-market, insists that social/collective benefits are maximized when each individual pursues their own self-interests. Placing our faith on forces of the free-market is akin to the misrepresentation of moral consciousness that occurs when the in-itself is separated from the for-itself. Moral actions, then, are largely dictated by profit-driven economics which ultimately create a false sense of fulfillment. Accordingly, moral actions are constantly at odds with actuality thereby continually contradict one another through a series of misrepresentations. The extent to which we value education, public spaces, people, plants, and animals seems to vary according to market forces. Reactions to the recent earthquake in Japan served as a gross example of this false moral consciousness. An anchorman on CNBC expressed his relief to find the earthquake’s negligible effects on the market by stating, “The human toll here looks to be much worse than the economic toll and we can be grateful for that.”
After searching for something/someone to exemplify the unity required of this antinomy, I’ve almost resorted to thinking that only plants and animals have achieved the unity of actuality and duty. But, this simplification ignores a large span of human history. Although our moral consciousness is susceptible to misrepresentations, according to Hegel, we are capable of recognizing such misrepresentations as contradictions. Much like Kant, Hegel does not believe we can complete this unity. Hegel, however, seems to consider the mere recognition of the antinomy and our striving for its unity as progress toward a higher level of consciousness.
The Dispersal of Spirit
Hegel spends a good portion of section c. on the notion of the ‘Dead Spirit’. He begins this section by describing the destruction of the universal unity (referring to the Greek Sittlichkeit destroyed by war) and the emergence of The Dead Spirit as ‘the universal split up into the atoms of absolutely as many individuals’. One can picture the split as the Greek Sittlichkeit (or the universal) and the subsequent creation of the innumerable atoms as the Roman Sittlichkeit.
This Dead Spirit is what constitutes the I in Roman ethical substance (along with Stoicism and Skepticism). This I is the untrue conception of self-consciousness through which the citizens believe they know their essential selves. This, Hegel argues is untrue since Substance contains the ‘form of fulfillment and content’ and the lack of Spirit has sent this content (in substance) into disarray. This I take to mean that the atoms from which the citizens are deriving meaning cannot truly hold any meaning because they lack the true original point [universal] which has some part in it where one would extrapolate a notion of self. So form and content change in each historical setting but they are always contained in substance?
This notion also designates the being as subsisting in and for-self since these multiple atoms are split into ‘an equality in which everyone counts as each one, that is, as persons’ (Of course not including slaves and women). Yet if everyone is equal, why is the Lord of The World necessary as a divine being; more specifically, why can he not just be the wisest or the exemplar of these equals instead? I suppose Hegel would call me a simple/abstract skeptic but the way he leaves out the Why question is rather annoying sometimes...
Finally, we shall speak on this Lord of The World. Hegel describes the multiplicity of atoms converging into one point which is the L.O.T.W. Yet this Lord is an ‘inactual impotent self’ mainly because he is not the realization of the godliness his subjects suppose. This I think could hypothetically be like a commoner off the street being recognized as The Lord of The World for illustrative purposes. The fact that all of the other people recognize this Lord of The World as such is the only thing that makes this true. This Lord of The World knows upon reflection that it in fact is not some divine collective point, but is bound to play his part. He is consequently sent spiraling into the lustful world in which Hegel describes the L.O.T.W. being subject to at the end of the chapter.
The image of this split of innumerable subsequent atoms helped me a lot in trying to picture the interconnectedness of the Roman community to the concept of Spirit. Whereas I felt the previous chapters (which) utilized the Greek plays were rather flat, I got a much better sense of how spirit is this over-arching thing from this chapter which was enhanced by the image; for example, I got a better sense of how the parts were constantly referring back to the whole and how the whole is cyclically held together by these parts by his referral to the points and atoms to the dead spirit. Yet Hegel does (of course) still confuse me because sometimes it seems like he is referring to the atoms (or points) as if they are the individuals themselves while other times they seem to be those shattered parts of the Greek’s ‘beautiful concord’; but hey it is Hegel, who says you’re supposed to actually be sure of anything?
Monday, March 21, 2011
Nature, Ethics, Freedom, etc.
A good portion of our class time has been spent on Hegel's notions of family and community. In the Sittlichkeit, Hegel illustrates the components that make up the whole - individual, family, and community. The community's citizenry is governed by human law, while the family is governed by divine law. Within the family, the relationship between brother and sister becomes the model through which citizens join the ethical life. The brother and sister, as equals and unfettered by desire for each other, shape and prepare one another for adult life. The sister becomes the ultimate individual and maintains the divine law in the home, while the brother, in exiting the home, enters the community and the governance of human law. Hegel shows the limitations of this model in the moments of conflict between the two laws, however, there are other nagging questions.
Hegel's family leaves no room for variation - this obviously poses problems when one tries to move outside of the husband/wife, brother/sister example given. Are we limiting our observations to only these types of families? What happens in a family with a brother but no sister? This relationship is central to the roles and development of citizens, and it has a very clear dialectic in the antithesis and synthesis of the two siblings. However, the determination of its components seems strange, since it is in no way representative of all families, and ignores any other family make-ups. There doesn't seem to be a clear way out, but then again Hegel offers a specific model of the way things are ideally - the workings of ethical life in its most perfect realization. Maybe it doesn't make sense to think of these ideas as being representative of, or corresponding, to an actual community or society.
Throughout the section on ethical life, Hegel writes of the triumphs of the ethical life over nature. It is the "natural attachment and sentiment" (p. 14) of husband and wife and parent to child that prevents those relationships from being fully reciprocal, or having "in itself its return to itself." The brother/sister relationship is ideal due to the lack of this natural attachment. In the act of burial, one again overcomes nature. Death is "the immediate, natural state of having been," and so the family must bury their dead as sort of a stamp of consciousness, and of citizenry and community - otherwise the dead shall "belong solely to nature and remain something irrational (p. 10)." Nature is, further, blamed for injustices in life which can mess of community up (this is what I think Hegel is saying when he says that "nature is the power that perpetrates upon consciousness the injustice of making it a pure thing [p. 19]").
In the natural, outside of community and law, there is no meaning or rationality. But why, then, should the naturalness of the "antithesis of the two sexes" give any significance to their "ethical determination (p. 16)," as Hegel writes? Why are the sexes limited so rigidly to roles determined naturally, by gender, if a purpose of the ethical life is to give meaning to citizens by trumping nature and its meaningless irrationality?
Sunday, March 20, 2011
Lord of the world
In VI A. c., “The Condition of Right”, Hegel discusses the Lord of the world (God). Hegel understands the Lord of the world to be the being who encompasses within himself all other beings. The Lord of the world is “the solitary person who has confronted all others” (33). The Lord of the world is the only being who knows himself completely, that is, he has a perfect account of his relationships with other beings. Being that this being knows his surrounding world totally, he knows exactly his position in the world, and he knows exactly what is best for himself and his community and he knows exactly how to achieve this. Hegel claims that this being is an actual conscious being, but I think this idea might be better understood as an ideal to strive for. I’m not sure if Hegel has earlier, or will later discuss the reason for believing there exists an actual “Lord of the world“, but I think the implications of this idea are the same whether or not this being exists in reality. If I’m not mistaken, I think what Hegel is suggesting here is that in becoming more acquainted with one’s position in the world, one’s actual existence, one will become closer to God (perfection), closer to living a life of harmony.
Ideally speaking, this idea makes very much sense. If it were the case that I knew everything perfectly, then I would have a perfect grasp of my situation, that is, I would know exactly what implications my actions had, and therefore I would know how to accomplish what I want, and I would not desire anything impossible because this would be irrational. Basically, if I were God this would work. Unfortunately I am not God, and I have a very limited perspective on things compared to the absolute. I am involved in countless relationships with people I don’t know (on the subway, etc.). Each and every one of these people has the power to change my life drastically; one might mug me, one might punch me, one might even kill me. Even in my personal relationships, I know my friends and family to a certain degree, but they have such complicated independent relationships, as do I, that I could not possibly have a good grasp of what they will do in certain situations. I don’t even know myself in this sense! There are times I surprise even myself with my own actions. At any moment in my life, there may occur an event which I had no possible way of foreseeing which changes everything, in fact this happens very often in real life. It is this dynamic, unpredictable aspect of life which is potentially devastating to the idea of (nearly) absolute knowledge. Despite all this, I think it is a good idea to understand ones own world. While this might not always work out to one's own benefit, or even the whole’s own benefit, generally it is beneficial to attempt to understand your position in life. My main problem with Hegel so far is that he is overly optimistic about the power of knowlege, but then again it may be this style of his which leads people to follow his instruction (to know the world) which I think is generally a good thing.
Ideally speaking, this idea makes very much sense. If it were the case that I knew everything perfectly, then I would have a perfect grasp of my situation, that is, I would know exactly what implications my actions had, and therefore I would know how to accomplish what I want, and I would not desire anything impossible because this would be irrational. Basically, if I were God this would work. Unfortunately I am not God, and I have a very limited perspective on things compared to the absolute. I am involved in countless relationships with people I don’t know (on the subway, etc.). Each and every one of these people has the power to change my life drastically; one might mug me, one might punch me, one might even kill me. Even in my personal relationships, I know my friends and family to a certain degree, but they have such complicated independent relationships, as do I, that I could not possibly have a good grasp of what they will do in certain situations. I don’t even know myself in this sense! There are times I surprise even myself with my own actions. At any moment in my life, there may occur an event which I had no possible way of foreseeing which changes everything, in fact this happens very often in real life. It is this dynamic, unpredictable aspect of life which is potentially devastating to the idea of (nearly) absolute knowledge. Despite all this, I think it is a good idea to understand ones own world. While this might not always work out to one's own benefit, or even the whole’s own benefit, generally it is beneficial to attempt to understand your position in life. My main problem with Hegel so far is that he is overly optimistic about the power of knowlege, but then again it may be this style of his which leads people to follow his instruction (to know the world) which I think is generally a good thing.
Wednesday, March 16, 2011
Hegel's Introduction to the POS
In the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel sets out his plan to go forward from the impasse and skepticism that was left by the idealism of his predecessors, Kant, Fichte and Schelling, as well as Descartes and Hume before them. Hegel makes the point that in all of the philosophising of these earlier thinkers there was an insistence on the "natural assumption" in which the first task of developing a philosophy or metaphysical system is to first embark on an inquiry into cognition, to understand first what the subject is capable of knowing about the object. In Kant as in transcendental philosophy generally, methaphysics is restored once it is demonstrated that the object conforms to the subject through universal sensibility and categories of thought. Their philsophic efforts were mostly concentrated in epistomologic projects not ontology. Kant's transcendental philosphy sets limits to human knowledge insisting that the object itself is unknowable. "The natural assumption" in the end leaves us with an unbrideable gap between consciousness and reality.
This scepticism is unaceptable to Hegel; he sets himself firmly on the path to uphold the mind's capacity to find reason in the world, to be "at home" in the world, in which there is unity of self and world. What's more, Hegel explains that the "natural assumption" characterizing prior philosophising as an investigation into cognitive capacity leads to absurdity because it unjustifiably assumes that we have the cognitive means to investigate and assess our cognitive abilities with certainty. So there would need to be an inquiry into our cognitive ability to assess cognition, and so on ad infinitum. So the "natural assumption" is really not presupositionless as suggested. For Hegel, there is no need, as for Kant, to "become acquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work for which it is be employed". Rather, says Hegel, we should just start and see how far we get, that is, from our commonsense knowledge of reprsentations only to a consciousness of the process through which the object creates our representations.
We cannot, however, just proceed with whatever presupositions we like. This would lead to the problem of ajudicating among differing presupossitions. A phenomological examination is, initially anyway, not science "because it has only phenomenological knowledge for its object...free and moving in its own peculiar shape, yet from this standpoint it can be regarded as the path as the path of the natural consciousness which presses forward to true knowledge; or the way of the Soul which journeys through the series of its configurations as though they were stations appointed for it by its own nature, so that it may purify itself for the life of the Spirit, and achieve finally, througha completed experience of itself, the awareness of what it really is, in reality, the detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of science." The presuposition of a phenomenological examination being experience, an account of consciousness as it appears from the subject's standpoint in which "the object...it is true, seems to be only for consciousness in the way that consciousness knows it; it seems that consciousness cannot, as it were, get behind the object as it exists for consciousness so as to examine what the object is in itself". Since, according to Hegel, consciousness moves through a logical, that is, a dialectical progression to the light of reason of its own accord, or "shapes of consciousness", we do not need to criticize the initial presuppositions, however erroneous, since as Hegel remarks, "what consciousness examines is its own self, all that is left for us to do is look on".
This scepticism is unaceptable to Hegel; he sets himself firmly on the path to uphold the mind's capacity to find reason in the world, to be "at home" in the world, in which there is unity of self and world. What's more, Hegel explains that the "natural assumption" characterizing prior philosophising as an investigation into cognitive capacity leads to absurdity because it unjustifiably assumes that we have the cognitive means to investigate and assess our cognitive abilities with certainty. So there would need to be an inquiry into our cognitive ability to assess cognition, and so on ad infinitum. So the "natural assumption" is really not presupositionless as suggested. For Hegel, there is no need, as for Kant, to "become acquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work for which it is be employed". Rather, says Hegel, we should just start and see how far we get, that is, from our commonsense knowledge of reprsentations only to a consciousness of the process through which the object creates our representations.
We cannot, however, just proceed with whatever presupositions we like. This would lead to the problem of ajudicating among differing presupossitions. A phenomological examination is, initially anyway, not science "because it has only phenomenological knowledge for its object...free and moving in its own peculiar shape, yet from this standpoint it can be regarded as the path as the path of the natural consciousness which presses forward to true knowledge; or the way of the Soul which journeys through the series of its configurations as though they were stations appointed for it by its own nature, so that it may purify itself for the life of the Spirit, and achieve finally, througha completed experience of itself, the awareness of what it really is, in reality, the detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of science." The presuposition of a phenomenological examination being experience, an account of consciousness as it appears from the subject's standpoint in which "the object...it is true, seems to be only for consciousness in the way that consciousness knows it; it seems that consciousness cannot, as it were, get behind the object as it exists for consciousness so as to examine what the object is in itself". Since, according to Hegel, consciousness moves through a logical, that is, a dialectical progression to the light of reason of its own accord, or "shapes of consciousness", we do not need to criticize the initial presuppositions, however erroneous, since as Hegel remarks, "what consciousness examines is its own self, all that is left for us to do is look on".
Monday, March 14, 2011
Subject-Object Third Party-ness
It's not my turn to blog until Marx, and so this won't be a full post, but I have a nagging question that has been bothering me as we read Hegel (which has been admittedly dreadful and dense to read). Hegel seems to hold that we need to be aware of others' awareness of us (we are the object to their subject), but how can this awareness be achieved if we can only ever be our own subject and the "in-itself" of objects (and thus the" subject" of other people-objects) is beyond us? Anyone? Bueller? Bueller? Bueller?
The emergence of Ethical Consciousness
In part b of Chapter Six of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel introduces ethical consciousness describing it at as self consciousness with "pure orientation to the ethical essentiality, or duty" ( p. 20). What does this mean (or how do I understand this question)? In oder to analyze it we must first understand human law and divine law.
In the previous section Hegel introduced two forms of law; human and divine. He attributes the human law to a male figure because (according to the era he is referring to in his writing), the male is who stepped outside of the family, held the power to make important decisions and thus was free both in the household and in the public sphere. On the contrary, the divine law is personified through women because, women are what hold the household together keeping the family in place. Therefore, the divine law (through dogmatic beliefs) will hold society together. That is as long as human law (free will) does not oppose it (p. 168-169).
At a universal level Human law and the Divine law will structure society and each individual in it. But on the individual level (self), human law and the divine law will oppose each other in order to reach singularity. Each self will make judgments (or serve their duty) according to the law they're adherent to. As a consequence they will oppose those who are not of their same identity and hold different judgements. As Hegel puts it, they will find the other guilty.
To make it even more interesting, Hegel adds the antithesis of the known and the unknown (which arises in consciousness) and the antithesis of consciousness and unconsciousness which arises in substance (p. 21). These antithesis are important because they will clearly define "ethical action" (if it cannot be yet in the paragraph above). A judgement or action that is made will be wrong even if it was performed unconsciously (unaware of either the divine or human law) and the object is unknown. (This is where the authors of this translation infer that Hegel is writing this with Oedipus on mind.)
For Hegel "what is ethical must be actual, for the actuality of the purpose is the purpose of the activity" (p 24). Therefore, ethical consciousness has to recognize its opposite as valid in its own in order for its own purpose to be valid. This allows the theoretical part to transform into practical, because this recognition occurs in the community. Each individual in the community has equal "right" and thus law will be the institution chosen by people that will grant it to each. ( This develops in part c "The condition of right")
Ethical consciousness is thus as Paul Trejo places it (in his website "Summary of Hegel's Philosophy of Mind") what leads us to a legal consciousness. Ethical consciousness is the process by which the individual recognizes itself and its own choices first and then recognizes the choices of others and accepts them (even if it does not concur with them) within the community. Giving opportunity for a system of unify law to emerge.
Saturday, March 12, 2011
A Clarification on Hegel's Absolute
A Clarification on Hegel's Absolute
Let me say, first of all, that the other Blog Post for this week will be better than mine. And I am certain of this to an almost perfect degree. Let us jam.
I've had a rough couple of hours, and because of that, I've decided to make my current hour a little worse—I'm going to attempt to explain Hegel's notion of Absolute. I will also attempt to explain the dialectic, and also Cartoons. This explanation will attempt to be clean and clear, but will most likely be muddled throughout with inaccuracy and slop. Let's go team Philosophy (the least successful team in March Madness History).
First, to the basics. Hegel's Absolute, in it's broadest sense is what Hegel feels allows for us to view existence with a sense of regularity—but, in a less muddled sense, what allows for us to exist in a word outside of intangibility. When first reading this I jumped to the conclusion that Hegel's notion of Absolute was nearly the same thing as Kant's Notion of Time and Space, that of course being that Time and Space are the baller as hell sunglasses that allow us to make sense of the world. Little did I know how I wrong I was. I even ruined my book by writing, “Time and Space= Absolute. Say What?”
Absolute is a lot harder to describe, as there isn't some cop out answer like, “we cannot know what it is, so just shut your mouth and listen”. There is a definition, albeit a very difficult one,and it requires us to understand Hegel's dialectic to understand his absolute. The Dialectic describes claims that rely on counter claims as a method to establishing prior claims of permanence. The result is not the end of the process, but it is certainly related to it. To simplify this to something that we all have some knowledge of, in Looney Tunes when Bugs Bunny and Daffy Duck squabble about which season it is, Duck or Rabbit, they confuse Elmer Fudd into changing his murder victim. When Bugs says “Duck Season”, Fudd, bumbling and loveable, thinks to shoot Daffy because Duck Season means, “You Don't Kill Rabbits In This Season.” When Daffy catches on and says, “Rabbit Season”, Fudd believes the inverse, as you do not kill ducks during rabbit season. This continues until Bugs Bunny, being a superior intellect switches his claim to “Rabbit Scene”, inversely, causing Daffy to bellow “Duck Season” and then get his beak shot off.
Prof. Vaughn said it much better with the saying “it is what it is not”. So forget I said anything.
Now, the Absolute. The Absolute, from a definition point of view, is a complete account of knowledge. It's the account of how we know. It's how we manage to overcome knowledge and the subject and the object to bring ourselves closer to what is absolutely, infallibly true. The Absolute tries to make it self known through a science, or a process of scrutinizing the way we know things. This can be likened to poking holes in a paper bag in order to see through the other side. Hegel argues that to reach this level of the absolute, we must consistently test the limits of what we believe to be true knowledge—which is pretty rad. He asserts that the Absolute, as a mother would, tries to prod human thought in the direction of the truth, but in that gentle prodding, begin to discover what it's own truth is. By moving us closer to it, it moves itself closer to what it will ultimately be. At the end of class on Wednesday, I said, quite oafishly, that the Absolute sort of functions as a car that is pulling another car.
Pretend that, for whatever reason, the Absolute is in Defiance, Ohio. Human Knowledge is broke down and driving aimlessly in that direction. However, it's been stuck on the road and has been broke down for damn near 200 years and has lost it's way. Somehow, Absolute comes in a pimped out Hemi and it only wants to help. He's headed to Defiance, Ohio because his sister lives there and she's getting married. He grabs a winch and attaches it to the front bumper of the broken down Human Knowledge car and begins to drive towards Defiance. As Absolute moves closer to itself, it pulls Human Knowledge with it, and Human Knowledge sees all of the trees and roads and Ohio wildlife on the way—establishing a new way to view nature and the world on the way to Defiance.
The End?
Monday, March 7, 2011
Introduction
I mostly only cover the broader sense of knowledge and conscious, and some parts in the end. I did not include everything in here. If I can, I would put a question mark behind every sentence because this anxiety and violence of my consciousness is currently in doubt of everything. Path of despair, here I go.
What is knowledge?
First, knowledge according to Hegel is our object; it exists for us and that the in-itself as knowledge is the truth of knowledge. Consciousness uses knowledge for its investigation. When we use our cognition as a medium and an instrument to grasp some other truth but not the truth in the absolute alone, the notion of true and untrue knowledge appears on the scene. [Q: But then what’s the difference between knowledge and cognition since both of them seems to be our object and instrument?] The science we recognize through appearance is untrue knowledge because it exists “to a bad mode of its being and to its appearance” [perhaps we can say mere representation?] rather than “exists in and for itself” (§76). On the other hand, true knowledge, also known as phenomenal knowledge, is “free and self-moving within its own distinctive shape” (§77). Because a fixed goal exists for knowledge, and there’s no need for it to go beyond itself and that knowledge can work itself out. He argues that only the natural consciousness can “untruth” true/phenomenal knowledge, even if it leads to the path of despair and doubt, while the absolute in the truth is “merely the unrealized concept” (§78).
What about consciousness?
Consciousness examines itself while itself being both a concept and an object. He notes that consciousness goes beyond itself; it can never satisfy itself and might even ruin its own satisfaction because it has an “anxiety about the truth” and that it suffers “violence by its rationality” (§80). Moreover, in section §84, he notes that conscious provides its own standards in examining itself, in other words, it is determinate by and through itself; it is also in-itself, it has a content, whereas it also has something for an other, and that is its “moments of knowledge”. Meanwhile, this other, “moments of knowledge,” is also the “moment of truth” [Q: Is he planting seeds for the spirit, religion, and finally, the absolute when he mentions about “moment of knowledge”? I’m not quite sure about what I’m talking about anymore.] Like knowledge, consciousness, too, exists in and for itself [it seems to me that Hegel defines EVERYTHING exists in and for itself, but also for the other? So, everything is technically interrelated with each other), but he warns the readers about the limitation of natural consciousness can only be proven to be the “concept of knowledge” and that it is “not real knowledge” (§78). While he notes that the path of consciousness is a path of despair and doubt, and that it might even loss itself and its truth, but somehow it can grasp some kind of truth. Consciousness can know about the object that’s for consciousness, but it is incapable of “testing its knowledge by the object” (§85). In §79, he also notes that consciousness can result in pure nothingness [skepticism detected here]. Pure nothingness is also determinate and has a content since it results in itself. So I guess pure nothingness is not simply nothingness after all, and it has some sort of truth in it, too.
What is this dialectical movement?
In the dialectical movement that Hegel discusses about, the consciousness examines what it does on itself, knowledge, and its objects and most importantly, to the new and true object of this movement, experience. So, in consciousness, we can say that there are two objects, one is “in-itself”, and the other is “being-for-it of this in-itself”, while the second is merely the representation or nullity of its knowledge of the first object. Because of the necessity, the second, namely the new object emerges. [Q: what is this “coming-to-be” in the end of §87?] The “spirit of truth” is the experience in which consciousness learns about itself in a system of consciousness itself.
I surrender.
What is knowledge?
First, knowledge according to Hegel is our object; it exists for us and that the in-itself as knowledge is the truth of knowledge. Consciousness uses knowledge for its investigation. When we use our cognition as a medium and an instrument to grasp some other truth but not the truth in the absolute alone, the notion of true and untrue knowledge appears on the scene. [Q: But then what’s the difference between knowledge and cognition since both of them seems to be our object and instrument?] The science we recognize through appearance is untrue knowledge because it exists “to a bad mode of its being and to its appearance” [perhaps we can say mere representation?] rather than “exists in and for itself” (§76). On the other hand, true knowledge, also known as phenomenal knowledge, is “free and self-moving within its own distinctive shape” (§77). Because a fixed goal exists for knowledge, and there’s no need for it to go beyond itself and that knowledge can work itself out. He argues that only the natural consciousness can “untruth” true/phenomenal knowledge, even if it leads to the path of despair and doubt, while the absolute in the truth is “merely the unrealized concept” (§78).
What about consciousness?
Consciousness examines itself while itself being both a concept and an object. He notes that consciousness goes beyond itself; it can never satisfy itself and might even ruin its own satisfaction because it has an “anxiety about the truth” and that it suffers “violence by its rationality” (§80). Moreover, in section §84, he notes that conscious provides its own standards in examining itself, in other words, it is determinate by and through itself; it is also in-itself, it has a content, whereas it also has something for an other, and that is its “moments of knowledge”. Meanwhile, this other, “moments of knowledge,” is also the “moment of truth” [Q: Is he planting seeds for the spirit, religion, and finally, the absolute when he mentions about “moment of knowledge”? I’m not quite sure about what I’m talking about anymore.] Like knowledge, consciousness, too, exists in and for itself [it seems to me that Hegel defines EVERYTHING exists in and for itself, but also for the other? So, everything is technically interrelated with each other), but he warns the readers about the limitation of natural consciousness can only be proven to be the “concept of knowledge” and that it is “not real knowledge” (§78). While he notes that the path of consciousness is a path of despair and doubt, and that it might even loss itself and its truth, but somehow it can grasp some kind of truth. Consciousness can know about the object that’s for consciousness, but it is incapable of “testing its knowledge by the object” (§85). In §79, he also notes that consciousness can result in pure nothingness [skepticism detected here]. Pure nothingness is also determinate and has a content since it results in itself. So I guess pure nothingness is not simply nothingness after all, and it has some sort of truth in it, too.
What is this dialectical movement?
In the dialectical movement that Hegel discusses about, the consciousness examines what it does on itself, knowledge, and its objects and most importantly, to the new and true object of this movement, experience. So, in consciousness, we can say that there are two objects, one is “in-itself”, and the other is “being-for-it of this in-itself”, while the second is merely the representation or nullity of its knowledge of the first object. Because of the necessity, the second, namely the new object emerges. [Q: what is this “coming-to-be” in the end of §87?] The “spirit of truth” is the experience in which consciousness learns about itself in a system of consciousness itself.
I surrender.
On Hegel's Introduction
So Hegel says that there is truth and there is untruth. There is phenomenal knowledge, which itself is untrue and there is absolute, which is the truth. Consciousness is something in which everything happens, e.g. events, time, space, thinking, learning. Another thing that Hegel implies, I think, is that knowledge is a sort of automatic process, that comes out of necessity, it happens by itself in consiousness, and all we have to do is just sit back and watch. Consciousness examines itself. Concepts and terms are arbitrary according to Hegel. It's is not that they are completely invalid, it's just that they don't grasp the full essence of things in consciousness, and therefore should be approached with care and not taken to the absolute level. There is also the idea that things that we get to know appear to be "for us" as opposed to be "for themselves". Not sure if my interpretation is 100% valid here, but I think "common sense", common way of perceiving things, is the result of this process of identification with known. When phenomenal knowledge takes place, the observer of that knowledge takes it as his or her own, e.g. immediately relevant to one's existence. When I see that it's raining I know that rain is happening, and recognize the phenomena of rain in relation to me (maybe I got wet, or I saw a discovery channel tv program about rain, it was part of my experience one way or another), but not necesarily in relation to itself. The moment I formulate the idea of rain as it relates to my experience, I deny it it's own essence (being for itself). Objectively, as whole, as the thing in itself I don't know what rain is. Similarly we make sense of the world using this "rain is what I feel at the moment or what I have been told by meteorolgists" approach, as opposed to "rain is rain" approach. Accepting this knowledge to be for ourselves therefore hinders our ability to go beyond it. Dialectical movement in consiousness resolves this persisting problem of describing indescribable. Instead of going into endless arguments about what rain actually is (6.9 billion people on earth will each present you a different picture) one can simply say that rain is what rain is not. Since rain is one of the innumerable phenomena in consciousness, we don't need to know what rain really is, rather we simply need to know what is it in relation to the absolute.
I don't think Hegel believes that knowing absolute is possible, - the idea of "someone knowing something" is part of that phenomenal knowlege which needs to be transcended, however, I think, what Hegel implies is that consciousness, by examining itself, can somehow come to absolute. Consciousness, examining itself through dialectical movement, e.g. negating itself as a whole and as consisting of parts, sort of "thins itself out" and becomes transparent to the point where absolute can shine through it.
Sunday, March 6, 2011
Need for an Exposition of Phenomenal Knowledge
So, Hegel's Introduction to the Spirit was no quick read. There are many points that Hegel brings up in this introduction alone, many of which probably escaped me, but here's my take on what I did seem to grasp:
Hegel's main point in the Introduction is to introduce a skepticism in his audience about the nature of our understanding of the absolute, the cognition, and their relation. He notes, "..before one gets down to dealing with what really matters, namely, the actual cognition of what there is in truth, it would first be necessary to reach prior agreement about cognition.." (73) Here, he begins to bring up the point that there are many disagreements about how to view cognition. Hegel says that the two main conflicting views about the nature of cognition are that it is either a.) a toolbox of concepts with which one can attain true knowledge of the absolute OR b.) that it is merely the means, the faculty by which we can hope to catch "a glimpse of it (the absolute)."
Hegel notes that there is an unease, an anxiety about falling into error because of an incorrect understanding of the cognition and its relation to the absolute. Further, he states that this anxiety is justifiable because cognition is thought of as something concrete, and of a "determinate kind and extent." (73) So, Hegel says that people assume that if we don't get these things right about cognition, if we don't define cognition with the determination and extent it itself is supposed to possess, then we will continuously find ourselves in error.
Moreover, Hegel fears that such thought might lead to the conviction that the whole attempt of trying to attain absolute knowledge is itself absurd. Why? Because "if we apply an instrument to something, the application DOES NOT in fact leave it be as it is on its own." (73) Rather, the application of the instrument (of cognition, as I understand), to something (here, I believe Hegel is referring to the absolute), the instrument (cognition) will leave its mark on the thing we are examining (the absolute). Thereby, we will be left with a tainted version of what the absolute truly is. Conversely, Hegel notes that it could be the case that cognition may NOT be "an instrument of our activity," but rather might be a "passive medium through which the light of the truth reaches us." Still, there's a problem with this, because we do not receive the truth in itself, but only the truth as it appears through the filter of this medium. "For it is not the refraction of the ray, but the ray itself whereby truth reaches us." (73)
So there's a problem with both cases of what role cognition serves in our pursuit of absolute knowledge, and that is that both cases lead to the notion of absurdity. Hegel questions both views because both versions "employ a means which immediately bring about a distortion," because the means turn the end into itself. Which is, again, ABSURD.
As Hegel begins to draw attention to the mistaken presuppositions we have, he makes an interesting statement on the nature of the absolute in relation to the cognition and our ability to ever know the absolute. He refers back to the idea of the cognition as an instrument, and says that even if somehow we were to have the instrument leave no mark upon the absolute, then we still might fail because the effort, and moreover, cognition itself would have been a "ruse." Hegel says that, "the absolute itself would cast scorn on this ruse "if it were not both in and for itself already there with us and wanted to be there." (73) So, can we know the absolute if the absolute does not want to be known? It's an interesting question, and I think it's strange that he almost personifies the absolute with the ability to decide if it shall be known or not. I'm not sure I agree with this view. The absolute must want to be known? I don't know.
He goes on to describe the nature and ratifications of the anxiety over error, and presents what I think is an important query: Perhaps this anxiety about falling into error IS the error? It is our anxiety about this error that itself presupposes that there is any truth at all. (74) Hegel urges that this whole operation be examined. Fear is what leads us into faulty presuppositions which lead us astray from any true understanding of the cognition and the absolute. The most viral presupposition, for Hegel, is fear's ability to presuppose that the absolute is separated from the cognition, and that the cognition exists alone. He clarifies, "..that is, it presupposes that since a cognition is external to the absolute, it is also indeed external to the truth, but that it is nonetheless itself truthful." (74)
So, if the absolute is separate from the cognition, and the absolute is the truth, how can the cognition exists apart from the absolute (the truth), and still itself be truthful?
Skipping ahead a little, Hegel suggests that we should stop worrying about faulty ways of talking and thinking about cognition and instead worry about these faulty presuppositions we have which render the "incapacity of science." (76) These presuppositions free us from the tedious work of science and comfort us with lies. This, for Hegel, illuminates another very interesting view: Fear of error might be a fear of truth.
So, we're lost. Is it even possible to find out just how far off the map we have gone? Hegel proposes that we must surpass these unconscious contradictions (faulty presuppositions) in order to begin to attain any truth.
Because of this, Hegel proposes: we need an exposition of phenomenal knowledge!
(This is where things begin to get a little convoluted.)
Hegel says that PK (Phenomenal Knowledge) can be understood as a path of "natural consciousness" which strives for true knowledge OR it can be taken as the path of the soul (I got a little confused here, as he continues,) "as it wanders through the series of the ways it takes shape, as if those shapes were stations laid out for it by its own nature so that it both might purify itself into spirit."
I'm not entirely sure what he means by "the series of ways it [the soul] takes shape," nor do I fully understand how this process (is it a process?) purifies the soul into the spirit. And I have no certain idea what the difference between soul and spirit is. What I do understand is the last part of this section where Hegel says that the spirit, through a "complete experience of itself" can attain a cognitive familiarity with what it is in itself. So we now know one important thing, the spirit is capable of knowing what it is in itself.
Further on in section 78, Hegel focuses on the relation between skepticism and the spirit. There's a lot in this part that I don't fully grasp. However, it seems that Hegel is saying that because skepticism directs itself to the entire range of phenomenal consciousness (what type of consciousness is this exactly?), it renders spirit competent to investigate what is truth because of the despair the skepticism elicits. (78) How exactly spirit reacts to this despair isn't clear to me either.
The intro is very dense and pretty long, so I want to flesh out what I thought were the main points from here on out.
In section 80, Hegel makes a note about the goal of knowledge, saying that the goal is "necessarily fixed," and can be found where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself. (Where the concept and the object correspond to each other.)
Just as knowledge can go beyond itself, consciousness too can. Hegel explains this by saying that the consciousness can posit each sole individual as well as "the other-worldly beyond." So, it can posit our identity and the world we see outside of ourselves.
Consciousness suffers because of this, "by its own hand." (80) This is because it must always think, always. Even if it were to try to stay thoughtless, there will always be a thought that comes in and ruins the thoughtlessness. Ok. So, Hegel's definitely not down with any type of zen understanding of what consciousness can or cannot do. Got that.
Next, he talks about vanity. Vanity for Hegel is detrimental, as it can "render every truth powerless." But how? And what sort of vanity are we talking about here? Well, he delves into this by saying first that our fear of the truth may lead consciousness to hide itself, both from itself and from the outside world, and take refuge behind the notion that its fervent strive for truth make it more difficult or even impossible to find any truth other than "the individual truth of vanity itself."(80) Hegel notes that this vanity wants to render truths powerless so that it can retract back into itself and revel in its cleverness. We must leave this vanity to itself, Hegel urges, because it runs from the universal and "seeks only being-for-itself." Therefore, this vanity is in our way of finding knowledge of the absolute. We must be aware of it and its cleverness, the false comfort it may bring, and put it aside.
Next, Hegel wants to mention something about the manner in which the exposition of PK will be carried out. He says that the exposition is represented as the "conduct of science," (not really clear on that one) and as "an investigation and examination of the reality of cognition." The last bit is more clear. He also remarks that first we must have a grounding standard on which to build this exposition. This standard may be science, or something else, but either way, Hegel notes that it should be recognized as the "essence," the "in-itself."(81) There comes a contradiction though, because we have not yet been able to justify something as the essence of another thing (we have never known the thing in itself, at least not yet), we cannot use this as a grounding standard if there have been no instances of it happening before. Therefore, no examination of cognition can take place. Oh no!
Ah, but
no worries, he responds to this contradiction in the following section..
To remove this contradiction we must remind ourselves of the "abstract determinations of knowledge and truth as they come before consciousness." (82) Consciousness at once can distinguish itself from something else and also relate itself to the thing. The "determinate aspect of this relating...is knowledge." Hegel doesn't want to get into the intricacies of the determinations and what they may genuinely hold. He repeats that our concern is with phenomenal knowledge, the determinations of which are also " at first taken up as they immediately present themselves." Does this mean that phenomenal knowledge takes place so immediately that we are unaware of it? Does it fall into the realm of unconsciousness?
In section 83, Hegel makes a remark about how we cannot be sure of the truth of knowledge. This is because when examining the truth of knowledge, it seems, to Hegel, that we are examining "what knowledge is in itself." The problem begins to surface when we realize that knowledge is also the object of our investigation, therefore it exists for us. Hence, the in-itself of knowledge, which would result from our examination of the truth of knowledge, would also be for us, even more so. Therefore, what we would claim to be the essence of knowledge would be nothing more than our knowledge of it, a representation, an interpretation.
In 84, Hegel notes that consciousness provides its own standard, and is thereby exempt from the "semblance of division and presupposition." This is because providing its own standard means the investigation will be a comparison of the thing (consciousness) with itself.
In this same section he says something that I don't quite understand, namely, "Within consciousness, there is one item for an other, that is, consciousness has the determinateness of the moments of knowledge in itself." (84) HUH? The more important notion here, I think, is the following: In what consciousness claims within itself to be the in-itself, we find the standard consciousness provides to measure knowledge. So, the standard for consciousness' measurement of knowledge is found withing what consciousness declares to be its in-itself, or its truth. That's pretty clear.
Next, Hegel presents two ways of going about measuring knowledge through consciousness. One path is to make knowledge the concept, and designate the essence as what exists, the object. Then, our examination will consists of seeing whether the concept corresponds to the object. The other path is to designate the essence as the concept, and "then in contrast understand by object the concept as object."(84) Both paths are the same. But it's important to hold onto this information, that both the idea of concept and of object fall within the knowledge we are examining. This way, we do not have to taint any knowledge we may find with our own standards, ideas, or thoughts. If we do this, then we "succeed in regarding what is at stake as it is in and for itself. (I'm kinda hazy on this last bit.)
In 85, Hegel first mentions that all we have to do is just sit back and let consciousness do what it does: examine itself. We are spared the trouble of doing any comparisons of object and concept. This is possible because of the nature of consciousness, namely that it is both consciousness of what it itself regards as the truth and consciousness of its knowledge of that truth. (85)
The object, then, only exists in the way consciousness sees it. Hegel notes that consciousness seems incapable of getting "behind the object." (85) Therefore, it seems that consciousness cannot really test its knowledge by the object.
Skipping ahead a little more, Hegel makes note that because of its content, Phenomenology is the experience of consciousness. In 89 he notes, "In terms of its concept, the experirence through which consciousness learns about itself can comprehend within itself nothing less than the entire system of consciousness, that is, the entire realm of spirit's truth."
Consciousness pushes itself towards its "true existence," and will reach a point where it will be able to leave behind the burden of all the superfluous and absurd talk and thought that lead to faulty presuppositions and un-truths. It will also leave aside anything that is not directly related to it, and anything that it does not recognize. "It will push itself to the point where appearance comes into parity with essence, where its own exposition at that point coincides with the true science of spirit." (89) Finally, when consciousness grasps its essence, it will indicate the nature of absolute knowledge by itself.
So, absolute knowledge is possible for Hegel, but it requires that we reexamine and reconstruct our ideas and concepts about the nature of knowledge, cognition, and the absolute in relation to the former two. It will only be when consciousness does enough self-reflecting that it understands its own essence, its own truth, that we will be able to reach absolute knowledge through it.
Hegel's main point in the Introduction is to introduce a skepticism in his audience about the nature of our understanding of the absolute, the cognition, and their relation. He notes, "..before one gets down to dealing with what really matters, namely, the actual cognition of what there is in truth, it would first be necessary to reach prior agreement about cognition.." (73) Here, he begins to bring up the point that there are many disagreements about how to view cognition. Hegel says that the two main conflicting views about the nature of cognition are that it is either a.) a toolbox of concepts with which one can attain true knowledge of the absolute OR b.) that it is merely the means, the faculty by which we can hope to catch "a glimpse of it (the absolute)."
Hegel notes that there is an unease, an anxiety about falling into error because of an incorrect understanding of the cognition and its relation to the absolute. Further, he states that this anxiety is justifiable because cognition is thought of as something concrete, and of a "determinate kind and extent." (73) So, Hegel says that people assume that if we don't get these things right about cognition, if we don't define cognition with the determination and extent it itself is supposed to possess, then we will continuously find ourselves in error.
Moreover, Hegel fears that such thought might lead to the conviction that the whole attempt of trying to attain absolute knowledge is itself absurd. Why? Because "if we apply an instrument to something, the application DOES NOT in fact leave it be as it is on its own." (73) Rather, the application of the instrument (of cognition, as I understand), to something (here, I believe Hegel is referring to the absolute), the instrument (cognition) will leave its mark on the thing we are examining (the absolute). Thereby, we will be left with a tainted version of what the absolute truly is. Conversely, Hegel notes that it could be the case that cognition may NOT be "an instrument of our activity," but rather might be a "passive medium through which the light of the truth reaches us." Still, there's a problem with this, because we do not receive the truth in itself, but only the truth as it appears through the filter of this medium. "For it is not the refraction of the ray, but the ray itself whereby truth reaches us." (73)
So there's a problem with both cases of what role cognition serves in our pursuit of absolute knowledge, and that is that both cases lead to the notion of absurdity. Hegel questions both views because both versions "employ a means which immediately bring about a distortion," because the means turn the end into itself. Which is, again, ABSURD.
As Hegel begins to draw attention to the mistaken presuppositions we have, he makes an interesting statement on the nature of the absolute in relation to the cognition and our ability to ever know the absolute. He refers back to the idea of the cognition as an instrument, and says that even if somehow we were to have the instrument leave no mark upon the absolute, then we still might fail because the effort, and moreover, cognition itself would have been a "ruse." Hegel says that, "the absolute itself would cast scorn on this ruse "if it were not both in and for itself already there with us and wanted to be there." (73) So, can we know the absolute if the absolute does not want to be known? It's an interesting question, and I think it's strange that he almost personifies the absolute with the ability to decide if it shall be known or not. I'm not sure I agree with this view. The absolute must want to be known? I don't know.
He goes on to describe the nature and ratifications of the anxiety over error, and presents what I think is an important query: Perhaps this anxiety about falling into error IS the error? It is our anxiety about this error that itself presupposes that there is any truth at all. (74) Hegel urges that this whole operation be examined. Fear is what leads us into faulty presuppositions which lead us astray from any true understanding of the cognition and the absolute. The most viral presupposition, for Hegel, is fear's ability to presuppose that the absolute is separated from the cognition, and that the cognition exists alone. He clarifies, "..that is, it presupposes that since a cognition is external to the absolute, it is also indeed external to the truth, but that it is nonetheless itself truthful." (74)
So, if the absolute is separate from the cognition, and the absolute is the truth, how can the cognition exists apart from the absolute (the truth), and still itself be truthful?
Skipping ahead a little, Hegel suggests that we should stop worrying about faulty ways of talking and thinking about cognition and instead worry about these faulty presuppositions we have which render the "incapacity of science." (76) These presuppositions free us from the tedious work of science and comfort us with lies. This, for Hegel, illuminates another very interesting view: Fear of error might be a fear of truth.
So, we're lost. Is it even possible to find out just how far off the map we have gone? Hegel proposes that we must surpass these unconscious contradictions (faulty presuppositions) in order to begin to attain any truth.
Because of this, Hegel proposes: we need an exposition of phenomenal knowledge!
(This is where things begin to get a little convoluted.)
Hegel says that PK (Phenomenal Knowledge) can be understood as a path of "natural consciousness" which strives for true knowledge OR it can be taken as the path of the soul (I got a little confused here, as he continues,) "as it wanders through the series of the ways it takes shape, as if those shapes were stations laid out for it by its own nature so that it both might purify itself into spirit."
I'm not entirely sure what he means by "the series of ways it [the soul] takes shape," nor do I fully understand how this process (is it a process?) purifies the soul into the spirit. And I have no certain idea what the difference between soul and spirit is. What I do understand is the last part of this section where Hegel says that the spirit, through a "complete experience of itself" can attain a cognitive familiarity with what it is in itself. So we now know one important thing, the spirit is capable of knowing what it is in itself.
Further on in section 78, Hegel focuses on the relation between skepticism and the spirit. There's a lot in this part that I don't fully grasp. However, it seems that Hegel is saying that because skepticism directs itself to the entire range of phenomenal consciousness (what type of consciousness is this exactly?), it renders spirit competent to investigate what is truth because of the despair the skepticism elicits. (78) How exactly spirit reacts to this despair isn't clear to me either.
The intro is very dense and pretty long, so I want to flesh out what I thought were the main points from here on out.
In section 80, Hegel makes a note about the goal of knowledge, saying that the goal is "necessarily fixed," and can be found where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself. (Where the concept and the object correspond to each other.)
Just as knowledge can go beyond itself, consciousness too can. Hegel explains this by saying that the consciousness can posit each sole individual as well as "the other-worldly beyond." So, it can posit our identity and the world we see outside of ourselves.
Consciousness suffers because of this, "by its own hand." (80) This is because it must always think, always. Even if it were to try to stay thoughtless, there will always be a thought that comes in and ruins the thoughtlessness. Ok. So, Hegel's definitely not down with any type of zen understanding of what consciousness can or cannot do. Got that.
Next, he talks about vanity. Vanity for Hegel is detrimental, as it can "render every truth powerless." But how? And what sort of vanity are we talking about here? Well, he delves into this by saying first that our fear of the truth may lead consciousness to hide itself, both from itself and from the outside world, and take refuge behind the notion that its fervent strive for truth make it more difficult or even impossible to find any truth other than "the individual truth of vanity itself."(80) Hegel notes that this vanity wants to render truths powerless so that it can retract back into itself and revel in its cleverness. We must leave this vanity to itself, Hegel urges, because it runs from the universal and "seeks only being-for-itself." Therefore, this vanity is in our way of finding knowledge of the absolute. We must be aware of it and its cleverness, the false comfort it may bring, and put it aside.
Next, Hegel wants to mention something about the manner in which the exposition of PK will be carried out. He says that the exposition is represented as the "conduct of science," (not really clear on that one) and as "an investigation and examination of the reality of cognition." The last bit is more clear. He also remarks that first we must have a grounding standard on which to build this exposition. This standard may be science, or something else, but either way, Hegel notes that it should be recognized as the "essence," the "in-itself."(81) There comes a contradiction though, because we have not yet been able to justify something as the essence of another thing (we have never known the thing in itself, at least not yet), we cannot use this as a grounding standard if there have been no instances of it happening before. Therefore, no examination of cognition can take place. Oh no!
Ah, but
no worries, he responds to this contradiction in the following section..
To remove this contradiction we must remind ourselves of the "abstract determinations of knowledge and truth as they come before consciousness." (82) Consciousness at once can distinguish itself from something else and also relate itself to the thing. The "determinate aspect of this relating...is knowledge." Hegel doesn't want to get into the intricacies of the determinations and what they may genuinely hold. He repeats that our concern is with phenomenal knowledge, the determinations of which are also " at first taken up as they immediately present themselves." Does this mean that phenomenal knowledge takes place so immediately that we are unaware of it? Does it fall into the realm of unconsciousness?
In section 83, Hegel makes a remark about how we cannot be sure of the truth of knowledge. This is because when examining the truth of knowledge, it seems, to Hegel, that we are examining "what knowledge is in itself." The problem begins to surface when we realize that knowledge is also the object of our investigation, therefore it exists for us. Hence, the in-itself of knowledge, which would result from our examination of the truth of knowledge, would also be for us, even more so. Therefore, what we would claim to be the essence of knowledge would be nothing more than our knowledge of it, a representation, an interpretation.
In 84, Hegel notes that consciousness provides its own standard, and is thereby exempt from the "semblance of division and presupposition." This is because providing its own standard means the investigation will be a comparison of the thing (consciousness) with itself.
In this same section he says something that I don't quite understand, namely, "Within consciousness, there is one item for an other, that is, consciousness has the determinateness of the moments of knowledge in itself." (84) HUH? The more important notion here, I think, is the following: In what consciousness claims within itself to be the in-itself, we find the standard consciousness provides to measure knowledge. So, the standard for consciousness' measurement of knowledge is found withing what consciousness declares to be its in-itself, or its truth. That's pretty clear.
Next, Hegel presents two ways of going about measuring knowledge through consciousness. One path is to make knowledge the concept, and designate the essence as what exists, the object. Then, our examination will consists of seeing whether the concept corresponds to the object. The other path is to designate the essence as the concept, and "then in contrast understand by object the concept as object."(84) Both paths are the same. But it's important to hold onto this information, that both the idea of concept and of object fall within the knowledge we are examining. This way, we do not have to taint any knowledge we may find with our own standards, ideas, or thoughts. If we do this, then we "succeed in regarding what is at stake as it is in and for itself. (I'm kinda hazy on this last bit.)
In 85, Hegel first mentions that all we have to do is just sit back and let consciousness do what it does: examine itself. We are spared the trouble of doing any comparisons of object and concept. This is possible because of the nature of consciousness, namely that it is both consciousness of what it itself regards as the truth and consciousness of its knowledge of that truth. (85)
The object, then, only exists in the way consciousness sees it. Hegel notes that consciousness seems incapable of getting "behind the object." (85) Therefore, it seems that consciousness cannot really test its knowledge by the object.
Skipping ahead a little more, Hegel makes note that because of its content, Phenomenology is the experience of consciousness. In 89 he notes, "In terms of its concept, the experirence through which consciousness learns about itself can comprehend within itself nothing less than the entire system of consciousness, that is, the entire realm of spirit's truth."
Consciousness pushes itself towards its "true existence," and will reach a point where it will be able to leave behind the burden of all the superfluous and absurd talk and thought that lead to faulty presuppositions and un-truths. It will also leave aside anything that is not directly related to it, and anything that it does not recognize. "It will push itself to the point where appearance comes into parity with essence, where its own exposition at that point coincides with the true science of spirit." (89) Finally, when consciousness grasps its essence, it will indicate the nature of absolute knowledge by itself.
So, absolute knowledge is possible for Hegel, but it requires that we reexamine and reconstruct our ideas and concepts about the nature of knowledge, cognition, and the absolute in relation to the former two. It will only be when consciousness does enough self-reflecting that it understands its own essence, its own truth, that we will be able to reach absolute knowledge through it.
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