Hegel defines morality primarily through duties. Morality is action-oriented and denies teleological pursuit as its development. Conscience, in this scenario, does not become, as it is most often used today, as the guiding principle of morality. It is not personified in the “angel and devil dichotomy on separate shoulders,” as we have come to often recognize it and associate it with. Conscience, for Hegel, is actually a negative phenomenon and is posited against morality, as such. Conscience exists for itself and does not recognize duties; as such, it becomes almost an antithesis for morality itself, and definitely opposed to consciousness.
In terms of actions, upon which morality is based, conscience directs them, and maybe perhaps even the right ones, but not in the same sense that morality does. Conscience makes the error of focusing merely on actions as opposed to duties. A same action that is carried for the mere sake of that action, as opposed to fulfilling a duty, is not moral. This mere action, though mimics the moral action, does not actually fulfill the duty and thus fails to be part of the realm of morality.
Conscience is not posited in an outside being, as morality ends up being projected, but exists for its self and its awareness of that. It is a form of subjectivism. It has something akin to “self-confidence” (though it is odd to think of it that way). This is the distinction between the in-itself and for-itself that Hegel posits. It can be compared to the human and divine law distinction, in some ways. The divine law would be universal and removed, thus making it exist in itself, while the human law is immediate to itself and the society. Conscience would fall on the side of human law, because its importance and relevance is temporary and immediate, but in the big scheme of things, it really does not accomplish much. This comparison will also hold for its relation to morality – they might sometimes be in agreement, but will ultimately diverge on the most important points and are reconcilable.
Conscience, as being for itself, does not surrender to universalism. It is its own being in the highest sense. This is part of the reason that it cannot be moral – because it cannot and would not subjugate itself to anything and morality demands the following of duties. Furthermore, these duties are abstract and pure, thus incompatible with the idea of conscience. Its own self-involvement, in a sense, is what holds it back from becoming either universal or abstract. It is concerned with a very small, circumscribed realm that is removed from such concepts. Conscience cannot cross the boundaries beyond that to become involved in the phenomenon of morality.
What would Hegel say about civil resistance of the type that Gandhi or Martin Luther King practiced? When African-Americans in the South deliberately broke the law by, for example, sitting at the front of the bus or sitting in a whites-only restaurant, was that the dictates of morality or conscience (according to Hegel)? Would he say that it was a conflict of law with conscience?
ReplyDeleteWhat about the situations where the law isn't so obviously wrong? Let's say a situation where anti-war protesters deliberately trespass on the White House lawn or storm a convention hall to wreck havoc with the system. The anti-trespass law that they are breaking is actually a reasonable one. It is wrong, in and of itself, that they break it. In another situation, it would be inexcusable to break it. However, if they bring attention to their cause or prompt the powers that be to stop waging an unjust war, is their breaking of the law justified?
In those examples, I think it's a matter of conflict between divine law (perhaps) and human law, rather than conscience and morality. Protests are a matter of breaking human law, but if the divine law states its necessity, then it prevails if you belong to that sphere. Civil disobedience is not a matter of morality because at the root of it is people fighting unfairness of treatment rather than fulfilling a certain duty.
ReplyDeleteI got a different vibe about the Conscience. It didn't seem to me that Conscience does not recognize duties. Rather, its truth is in actualized duty as opposed to pure duty. One could say that it doesn't recognize the "empty abstraction of pure thought", because the truth of Conscience lies in its own "immediate certainty" of action (p. 137, paragraph 637). Conscience does act in accordance with duty, but does not recognize the potentially contradictory "diverse moral substances" of possible action/pure duty - it just "knows and does what is concretely right" (p. 136, paragraph 635). So, instead of a deed's validity coming from the universality of a duty (considering the morality outside itself), now the validity comes from recognition of the action.
ReplyDeleteI don't think I agree with the analogy Maria makes with human/divine law, since Conscience seems to be more about the relation of singular action to duty or law than about a balance between laws. I dunno.
I'm not sure that civil rights protests can be accurately described with the text we're reading (not by me, at least). But as for Agatha's example, where there is a disparity between law and perceived moral duty - one could say that that's an example of Conscience acting in step with what it knows to be concretely right. One could say that protests in the scenarios described are founded (at least partly) in the belief that "laws exist for the sake of the self, rather than for the self existing for the sake of the law" - which is the perspective of Conscience (p. 138)
But in the example of the civil rights protests, is not the law set by the culture / society? In the Greek example, the men had act according to their duties to the polis, regardless of what their inner morality was telling them. Would Hegel not argue (like Kant seemingly would) that we always need to act in line with out duties, part of which are our duties to society? It seems to me that any sort of protest against establish rules would fall out of line with their sense of morality. Unless I'm wrong, which is certainly possible given the complexity of the material.
ReplyDeleteI would agree that conscience does not recognize or posit the abstract ideas of morality, but would have to still argue that it is actualized moral action. Conscience is "simple action...which does not fulfill this or that duty" (136; 199-635). Thus it is not acting in conjunction with morality and its duties, it is the mere action itself and even if that action is in accordance with moral action, it does not fulfill the duty itself.
ReplyDeleteKant and Hegel would overall disagree with civil disobedience. I would argue that there is no moral duty per se that would allow for civil disobedience. Women never interfere with the human law just for the sake of interfering or changing it, they only come into contact with it (and break it) when divine law is in conflict with it. At that point, it is not their intention to change that law (nor do they even necessarily have an opinion as to its validity), but only to complete their divine duties. Seeing Hegel's double division of law, I would think that it is still applicable to morality.
I'm still wrapping my head around Hegelian morality but I would think that Kant, based on my understanding of his ethics and our discussion last class, would *not* view civil disobedience as a moral action.
ReplyDeleteUsing Agatha's trespassing example, the protestors are violating one law (I will not trespass on another's property) in order to bring light to a bigger issue.
There are two problems here, for Kant, that would cause it to fail the categorical imperative:
1. It's not universal. "I shall not trespass on another's property" is a universal maxim that could easily be viewed as applicable to all cases and all times; however, when you add the "UNLESS I am protesting something I disagree with" you strip it of that universality
2. It focuses on the goal of the action, not the duty itself. The effect of protesting as such is to bring light or action to circumstances that you deem wrong; you are violating laws in order to achieve that goal not because the action itself is for the good and would create an natural contradiction if universalized.
The common example that would be parallel to this is the "Tell the truth" example with Anne Frank.
By Kantian standards, to "tell the truth" is an ethical duty and the morally correct action is to always do so.
So what if Nazis are knocking on the door and you have Anne Frank hiding in your attic? What do you do when they ask "Are you harboring any fugitives?"
Kant would say that the morally correct action is to admit that yes, you are.
In response to Agathas’ question of what Hegel would say to say about Ghandi’s obedience?
ReplyDeleteIn Ghandi’s case, his protest demonstrated an action of moral duty consistent with individual freedom. If I had to speculate on what Hegel would say I would refer to the class discussion, on the Master-Servant relationship, where Ghandi is a Slavish Consciousness to the Master Consciousness of the British Imperial Guard.
For the sake of the Master Consciousness, the Slave Consciousness exerts its labor/s e.g. production of Indian Silk for British profit. It is through these exertions of labors amongst other experiences, say violence inflicted on the Slave Consciousness by the British Imperial Guard, that the Slave Consciousness studies the ways of British Consciousness that has it subdued. In addition, the Slave Consciousness accumulates wisdom of itself. Thus, through indignities it identifies dignity, and becomes dignified. Eventually, Slave Consciousness will transform in his state of Slave Consciousness. In other words, he will still be a Slave Consciousness, for it is yet to be recognized otherwise, but it is not obliged to a Master Consciousness.
The main objective of this example is to illustrate, how through the awareness that is developed through the Slave Consciousness’ inferior position to its Master Consciousness, moral duty can become recognized and actualized. Thus, it allows for the possibility of emancipation of itself, just as India eventually achieved independence from the British Occupation.