So, Hegel's Introduction to the Spirit was no quick read. There are many points that Hegel brings up in this introduction alone, many of which probably escaped me, but here's my take on what I did seem to grasp:
Hegel's main point in the Introduction is to introduce a skepticism in his audience about the nature of our understanding of the absolute, the cognition, and their relation. He notes, "..before one gets down to dealing with what really matters, namely, the actual cognition of what there is in truth, it would first be necessary to reach prior agreement about cognition.." (73) Here, he begins to bring up the point that there are many disagreements about how to view cognition. Hegel says that the two main conflicting views about the nature of cognition are that it is either a.) a toolbox of concepts with which one can attain true knowledge of the absolute OR b.) that it is merely the means, the faculty by which we can hope to catch "a glimpse of it (the absolute)."
Hegel notes that there is an unease, an anxiety about falling into error because of an incorrect understanding of the cognition and its relation to the absolute. Further, he states that this anxiety is justifiable because cognition is thought of as something concrete, and of a "determinate kind and extent." (73) So, Hegel says that people assume that if we don't get these things right about cognition, if we don't define cognition with the determination and extent it itself is supposed to possess, then we will continuously find ourselves in error.
Moreover, Hegel fears that such thought might lead to the conviction that the whole attempt of trying to attain absolute knowledge is itself absurd. Why? Because "if we apply an instrument to something, the application DOES NOT in fact leave it be as it is on its own." (73) Rather, the application of the instrument (of cognition, as I understand), to something (here, I believe Hegel is referring to the absolute), the instrument (cognition) will leave its mark on the thing we are examining (the absolute). Thereby, we will be left with a tainted version of what the absolute truly is. Conversely, Hegel notes that it could be the case that cognition may NOT be "an instrument of our activity," but rather might be a "passive medium through which the light of the truth reaches us." Still, there's a problem with this, because we do not receive the truth in itself, but only the truth as it appears through the filter of this medium. "For it is not the refraction of the ray, but the ray itself whereby truth reaches us." (73)
So there's a problem with both cases of what role cognition serves in our pursuit of absolute knowledge, and that is that both cases lead to the notion of absurdity. Hegel questions both views because both versions "employ a means which immediately bring about a distortion," because the means turn the end into itself. Which is, again, ABSURD.
As Hegel begins to draw attention to the mistaken presuppositions we have, he makes an interesting statement on the nature of the absolute in relation to the cognition and our ability to ever know the absolute. He refers back to the idea of the cognition as an instrument, and says that even if somehow we were to have the instrument leave no mark upon the absolute, then we still might fail because the effort, and moreover, cognition itself would have been a "ruse." Hegel says that, "the absolute itself would cast scorn on this ruse "if it were not both in and for itself already there with us and wanted to be there." (73) So, can we know the absolute if the absolute does not want to be known? It's an interesting question, and I think it's strange that he almost personifies the absolute with the ability to decide if it shall be known or not. I'm not sure I agree with this view. The absolute must want to be known? I don't know.
He goes on to describe the nature and ratifications of the anxiety over error, and presents what I think is an important query: Perhaps this anxiety about falling into error IS the error? It is our anxiety about this error that itself presupposes that there is any truth at all. (74) Hegel urges that this whole operation be examined. Fear is what leads us into faulty presuppositions which lead us astray from any true understanding of the cognition and the absolute. The most viral presupposition, for Hegel, is fear's ability to presuppose that the absolute is separated from the cognition, and that the cognition exists alone. He clarifies, "..that is, it presupposes that since a cognition is external to the absolute, it is also indeed external to the truth, but that it is nonetheless itself truthful." (74)
So, if the absolute is separate from the cognition, and the absolute is the truth, how can the cognition exists apart from the absolute (the truth), and still itself be truthful?
Skipping ahead a little, Hegel suggests that we should stop worrying about faulty ways of talking and thinking about cognition and instead worry about these faulty presuppositions we have which render the "incapacity of science." (76) These presuppositions free us from the tedious work of science and comfort us with lies. This, for Hegel, illuminates another very interesting view: Fear of error might be a fear of truth.
So, we're lost. Is it even possible to find out just how far off the map we have gone? Hegel proposes that we must surpass these unconscious contradictions (faulty presuppositions) in order to begin to attain any truth.
Because of this, Hegel proposes: we need an exposition of phenomenal knowledge!
(This is where things begin to get a little convoluted.)
Hegel says that PK (Phenomenal Knowledge) can be understood as a path of "natural consciousness" which strives for true knowledge OR it can be taken as the path of the soul (I got a little confused here, as he continues,) "as it wanders through the series of the ways it takes shape, as if those shapes were stations laid out for it by its own nature so that it both might purify itself into spirit."
I'm not entirely sure what he means by "the series of ways it [the soul] takes shape," nor do I fully understand how this process (is it a process?) purifies the soul into the spirit. And I have no certain idea what the difference between soul and spirit is. What I do understand is the last part of this section where Hegel says that the spirit, through a "complete experience of itself" can attain a cognitive familiarity with what it is in itself. So we now know one important thing, the spirit is capable of knowing what it is in itself.
Further on in section 78, Hegel focuses on the relation between skepticism and the spirit. There's a lot in this part that I don't fully grasp. However, it seems that Hegel is saying that because skepticism directs itself to the entire range of phenomenal consciousness (what type of consciousness is this exactly?), it renders spirit competent to investigate what is truth because of the despair the skepticism elicits. (78) How exactly spirit reacts to this despair isn't clear to me either.
The intro is very dense and pretty long, so I want to flesh out what I thought were the main points from here on out.
In section 80, Hegel makes a note about the goal of knowledge, saying that the goal is "necessarily fixed," and can be found where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself. (Where the concept and the object correspond to each other.)
Just as knowledge can go beyond itself, consciousness too can. Hegel explains this by saying that the consciousness can posit each sole individual as well as "the other-worldly beyond." So, it can posit our identity and the world we see outside of ourselves.
Consciousness suffers because of this, "by its own hand." (80) This is because it must always think, always. Even if it were to try to stay thoughtless, there will always be a thought that comes in and ruins the thoughtlessness. Ok. So, Hegel's definitely not down with any type of zen understanding of what consciousness can or cannot do. Got that.
Next, he talks about vanity. Vanity for Hegel is detrimental, as it can "render every truth powerless." But how? And what sort of vanity are we talking about here? Well, he delves into this by saying first that our fear of the truth may lead consciousness to hide itself, both from itself and from the outside world, and take refuge behind the notion that its fervent strive for truth make it more difficult or even impossible to find any truth other than "the individual truth of vanity itself."(80) Hegel notes that this vanity wants to render truths powerless so that it can retract back into itself and revel in its cleverness. We must leave this vanity to itself, Hegel urges, because it runs from the universal and "seeks only being-for-itself." Therefore, this vanity is in our way of finding knowledge of the absolute. We must be aware of it and its cleverness, the false comfort it may bring, and put it aside.
Next, Hegel wants to mention something about the manner in which the exposition of PK will be carried out. He says that the exposition is represented as the "conduct of science," (not really clear on that one) and as "an investigation and examination of the reality of cognition." The last bit is more clear. He also remarks that first we must have a grounding standard on which to build this exposition. This standard may be science, or something else, but either way, Hegel notes that it should be recognized as the "essence," the "in-itself."(81) There comes a contradiction though, because we have not yet been able to justify something as the essence of another thing (we have never known the thing in itself, at least not yet), we cannot use this as a grounding standard if there have been no instances of it happening before. Therefore, no examination of cognition can take place. Oh no!
Ah, but
no worries, he responds to this contradiction in the following section..
To remove this contradiction we must remind ourselves of the "abstract determinations of knowledge and truth as they come before consciousness." (82) Consciousness at once can distinguish itself from something else and also relate itself to the thing. The "determinate aspect of this relating...is knowledge." Hegel doesn't want to get into the intricacies of the determinations and what they may genuinely hold. He repeats that our concern is with phenomenal knowledge, the determinations of which are also " at first taken up as they immediately present themselves." Does this mean that phenomenal knowledge takes place so immediately that we are unaware of it? Does it fall into the realm of unconsciousness?
In section 83, Hegel makes a remark about how we cannot be sure of the truth of knowledge. This is because when examining the truth of knowledge, it seems, to Hegel, that we are examining "what knowledge is in itself." The problem begins to surface when we realize that knowledge is also the object of our investigation, therefore it exists for us. Hence, the in-itself of knowledge, which would result from our examination of the truth of knowledge, would also be for us, even more so. Therefore, what we would claim to be the essence of knowledge would be nothing more than our knowledge of it, a representation, an interpretation.
In 84, Hegel notes that consciousness provides its own standard, and is thereby exempt from the "semblance of division and presupposition." This is because providing its own standard means the investigation will be a comparison of the thing (consciousness) with itself.
In this same section he says something that I don't quite understand, namely, "Within consciousness, there is one item for an other, that is, consciousness has the determinateness of the moments of knowledge in itself." (84) HUH? The more important notion here, I think, is the following: In what consciousness claims within itself to be the in-itself, we find the standard consciousness provides to measure knowledge. So, the standard for consciousness' measurement of knowledge is found withing what consciousness declares to be its in-itself, or its truth. That's pretty clear.
Next, Hegel presents two ways of going about measuring knowledge through consciousness. One path is to make knowledge the concept, and designate the essence as what exists, the object. Then, our examination will consists of seeing whether the concept corresponds to the object. The other path is to designate the essence as the concept, and "then in contrast understand by object the concept as object."(84) Both paths are the same. But it's important to hold onto this information, that both the idea of concept and of object fall within the knowledge we are examining. This way, we do not have to taint any knowledge we may find with our own standards, ideas, or thoughts. If we do this, then we "succeed in regarding what is at stake as it is in and for itself. (I'm kinda hazy on this last bit.)
In 85, Hegel first mentions that all we have to do is just sit back and let consciousness do what it does: examine itself. We are spared the trouble of doing any comparisons of object and concept. This is possible because of the nature of consciousness, namely that it is both consciousness of what it itself regards as the truth and consciousness of its knowledge of that truth. (85)
The object, then, only exists in the way consciousness sees it. Hegel notes that consciousness seems incapable of getting "behind the object." (85) Therefore, it seems that consciousness cannot really test its knowledge by the object.
Skipping ahead a little more, Hegel makes note that because of its content, Phenomenology is the experience of consciousness. In 89 he notes, "In terms of its concept, the experirence through which consciousness learns about itself can comprehend within itself nothing less than the entire system of consciousness, that is, the entire realm of spirit's truth."
Consciousness pushes itself towards its "true existence," and will reach a point where it will be able to leave behind the burden of all the superfluous and absurd talk and thought that lead to faulty presuppositions and un-truths. It will also leave aside anything that is not directly related to it, and anything that it does not recognize. "It will push itself to the point where appearance comes into parity with essence, where its own exposition at that point coincides with the true science of spirit." (89) Finally, when consciousness grasps its essence, it will indicate the nature of absolute knowledge by itself.
So, absolute knowledge is possible for Hegel, but it requires that we reexamine and reconstruct our ideas and concepts about the nature of knowledge, cognition, and the absolute in relation to the former two. It will only be when consciousness does enough self-reflecting that it understands its own essence, its own truth, that we will be able to reach absolute knowledge through it.
I understood the sentence "Within consciousness, there is one item for an other, that is, consciousness has the determinateness of the moments of knowledge in itself" (84) to mean that consciousness has, within itself, the concept and object, and that there is at once the in-itself (as the objects exists) and for-itself (as it exists for us). These are the moments, or aspects, of knowledge - all contained within our consciousness. We conduct our phenomenological investigations by examining them in their relation to each other - as you described in your post.
ReplyDeleteIt's interesting to compare this to Kant. In redefining/rearranging the process of experience and consciousness' relation to the object, Hegel sidesteps the limitations of knowledge. Also, Kant moved away from a correspondence theory of truth - for him, appearances could never have apodictic certainty - and Hegel seems to propose a correspondence theory where both the object and its referent are inside our consciousness.
What's most difficult, to me, about this introduction is that all these obtuse ideas are discussed completely abstractly. Hard to digest all of it once. Hopefully he'll use some examples, if possible, to flesh things out in the future readings.
Thanks for explaining that first bit about consciousness. I think I get it now. And yes! I was comparing him to Kant in my head the entire time I was reading it. It is very interesting to see the different views on the relation between consciousness, experience, the absolute, and cognition along with its faculties.
ReplyDeleteI like your point about the correspondence theory, and I tend to agree more with Kant's version of this. It just makes more sense that appearances could never hold apodictic certainty given all the filters it must go through within our mental faculties. I'm not sure if Hegel's point is a direct opposition of this. For me, Hegel's proposition that, as you said, both the object and its referent are inside our consciousness makes sense, because both of these things can be within our minds, being processed and transformed into knowledge and understanding, etc. etc.; however, that doesn't necessarily mean, at least as I understand it, that the object ORIGINATES in our consciousness, merely that we are aware of it.
I could definitely be wrong, and I fully agree that the ideas are vague and abstract. I'm pretty sure he'll flesh things out with more clarity in the main text. I hope, at least.
I would be lying if I said I understand Hegel yet in any significant way, but I do like that he stresses the importance of relations. In the real world there exists neither things in themselves nor appearances in themselves and to consider any object out of context is to miss its importance of the object, that is, to miss what the object really is. A purely metaphysical account of an object misses the relevant prepositions attributed to it, and we are left with merely stuff. I agree that a thing “is what it is not”, but this is clearly problematic in that we have no way of properly knowing all that is relevantly not the specific thing. It is for this reason that, on this account, every object will have a subjective consistency. For example I see X as being not, or in relation to, A,B,C,D & E, and you see X as being not A,B,D & E. You did not know C existed. It is not in itself a problem that our conceptions of X differ, but this seems to be a problem for what I take to be Hegel’s philosophy so far.
ReplyDeleteHegel seems to be overly optimistic about the capability of our consciousnesses (our own capability) to reach a point of perfection. There will always be things we don’t know that we don’t know, things which are possibly crucial to a “proper” consciousness. In addition, Hegel seems to speak of a consciousness as something which is other than a person, other than an individual. He talks about the consciousness necessarily striving for what is truth. This seems wrong. Perhaps this is the case for most of us students of philosophy, but look around, people do not necessarily want to find truth. I think more often than not people look for the exact opposite, they look for distractions. People in general want to be happy, to be entertained, more than anything else, if they follow the path of consciousness to the absolute it is very likely they will say “I don’t like this”, and go back in the other direction, a direction which is not necessarily the wrong way.
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ReplyDeleteThe vanity that Hegel speaks about is our own. There are different "sources" of our opinions, which we often take to be knowledge. This vanity makes us tenacious in our opinions and knowledge and often makes us reject other facts, though they might be true. Vanity renders the truth powerless in that way. Hegel for that matter does not criticize accepting opinions and knowledge based on authority (unlike many of his predecessors) - because the source matters less than the content.
ReplyDeleteWe have to wholly believe in our view (thesis) when we have it, but when we discover its limits (anti-thesis) we have to move beyond it and be ready to let go of what we wholeheartedly believed a moment before. Our vanity of our own infallibility should not be in the way of this process.